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“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy 
in its own way.” 
LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA (1878) 
INTRODUCTION 
he objective of this symposium piece is to explore why share-
holder derivative suits are rare in Continental Europe. I mainly 
focus on Germany, France, and Italy, and further provide less extensive 
references regarding derivative suits in Austria, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Spain, and Switzerland. In doing so, I compare the Continental 
European situation with the one in the United States and Japan, where 
derivative suits are important mechanisms of corporate governance en-
forcement. It is sometimes thought that shareholder litigation and liti-
giousness in general are cultural features of U.S. society.1 In Japan—
where shareholder derivative suits have also become common since the 
early 1990s—cultural theories gave way to theories emphasizing eco-
nomic incentives that were more strongly supported by the evidence, as 
no discernible cultural shift occurred when suits became widespread.2 I 
also emphasize economic incentives set by the legal framework to ex-
plain the scarcity of derivative suits in Continental Europe. This explana-
tion, similar to the explanation provided for Japan, is also only cultural as 
far as legal and structural constraints setting these incentives are part of 
the respective culture. The two points I seek to make are summarized 
under the headings of the “Anna Karenina Principle” and “The Path of 
Least Resistance.” 
                                                                                                  
 1. See, e.g., Scott H. Mollett, Derivative Lawsuits Outside of Their Cultural Context: 
The Divergent Examples of Japan and Italy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 635, 654 (2009); Mathias 
M. Siems, Private Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: Derivative Actions as a Global 
Phenomenon, in COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING 
MULTILAYER INTERESTS? 4 (Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel & Mathias Siems eds., 
forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699353 (both discussing cul-
tural explanations of derivative litigation). 
 2. Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the 
United States, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1436, 1439–41 (1994) [hereinafter West, Pricing Share-
holder Derivative Actions in Japan & U.S.] (criticizing cultural explanations). 
T 
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In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book Guns, Germs and Steel, geographer 
and biologist Jared Diamond popularized the “Anna Karenina Principle” 
based on the first line of Leo Tolstoy’s classic novel. Tolstoy suggested 
that happy families share a number of core characteristics that must all be 
present to ensure happy family life. Diamond varies the idea to explain 
that an animal species needs to meet a list of criteria, including diet, so-
cial behavior, and breeding habits, to be susceptible to domestication by 
humans.3 The relatively small number of domesticable species can thus 
be explained by the observation that if even one criterion on the list is not 
met, the species would be too onerous to employ for human purposes. 
Likewise, only the United States and Japan seem to “get it right” with 
respect to all necessary criteria to make derivative litigation a successful 
model for shareholders. By contrast, no single factor suffices to account 
for the scarcity of derivative litigation in Continental Europe—or even a 
single country. I survey the available and some additional explanations, 
and suggest that several criteria have to be met to make derivative suits 
attractive. 
The small number of derivative suits in Continental Europe is often 
seen as a reason why corporate law is considered underenforced in these 
jurisdictions.4 While I do not attempt to disprove this claim, I suggest 
that there is a significant degree of enforcement through channels of cor-
porate law, beyond enforcement derived from derivative suits. If a legal 
system discourages derivative suits, disgruntled shareholders will take 
the “Path of Least Resistance,” and resort to other enforcement mecha-
nisms. I, therefore, address other ways in which shareholders of Euro-
pean corporations can seek judicial recourse that do not take the shape of 
derivative litigation. While this does not imply that there is the same 
quality and quantity of enforcement in Europe as in the United States, we 
can identify at least a limited range of partial functional equivalents. 
The article proceeds as follows: Part 1 begins by discussing the basics: 
Part 1.1 defines the scope of the investigation and establishes some com-
parative fundamentals. While European legal systems distinguish be-
tween two legal forms, namely the public company5 and the private 
                                                                                                  
 3. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL 157–75 (1997). 
 4. E.g., Gérard Hertig, Western Europe’s Corporate Governance Dilemma, in 
CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS, AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW 265, 280 (Theodor Baums, 
Klaus J. Hopt & Norbert Horn eds., 2000). 
 5. This includes the German, Austrian, and Swiss Aktiengesellschaft; the French, 
Swiss, and Belgian société anonyme; the Italian società per azioni; the Spanish sociedad 
anónima; and the Dutch and Belgian Naamloze vennootschap. A firm incorporated as a 
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company,6 I discuss only the former (derivative suits tend to be easier in 
the latter category). Section 1.2 describes the general issue all corporate 
law systems have to deal with, namely the tradeoff between effective 
enforcement of corporate law and prevention of abusive lawsuits that are 
used to divert resources to plaintiffs. Part 1.3 gives a brief overview of 
the various European models of shareholder litigation. Part 2 discusses 
possible reasons for the absence of derivative suits in Continental 
Europe. Some of the arguments have been discussed frequently, such as 
minimum ownership thresholds and the distribution of litigation risk 
through litigation cost rules. Others have received less or no attention, 
such as limits to the information available to defendants, and limits to 
who can be sued derivatively. Part 3 suggests that the absence of deriva-
tive suits may not be as detrimental as one might think at first glance by 
showing that derivative litigation is not the only possible avenue for pri-
vate corporate law enforcement. Without attempting to provide a com-
plete picture, I look at three Continental European enforcement models, 
as follows: Part 3.1 investigates rescission (nullification) suits, which are 
common in several countries, but subject to a particularly intense debate 
in Germany, where it is often argued that they can be abused by “preda-
tory shareholders”; 3.2 discusses criminal enforcement under French law, 
on which shareholders are able to “piggyback”; and 3.3 looks at the 
Dutch model, where derivative suits are not available and the unique “in-
quiry proceedings” are the chosen method for resolution of many corpo-
rate conflicts of interest. The larger theoretical point is that shareholders 
will seek the “path of least resistance” in litigation. If derivative litigation 
does not provide a good option, maybe another legal mechanism (such as 
the ones described in Part 3) will. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes 
and concludes. 
1. THE BASICS 
1.1. The Significance of Derivative Suits 
Robert Clark emphasizes that the American derivative suit was origi-
nally conceived as a combination of two suits: “The plaintiff (1) brought 
                                                                                                  
public company does not necessarily have to be publicly traded (the majority of firms are 
not). 
 6. The German, Austrian, and Swiss Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung; the 
French, Swiss, and Belgian société à responsabilité limitée; the Italian società a respon-
sabilità limitata; the Spanish Sociedad de responsabilidad limitada; and the Dutch and 
Belgian Besloten vennootschap are therefore not discussed, as well as newer “hybrid” 
forms such as the French société par actions simplifiée. 
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a suit in equity against the corporation seeking an order compelling it (2) 
to bring a suit for damages or other relief against some third person.”7 
Derivative suits were—and are—typically brought against directors or 
officers of the corporation.8 While litigation on behalf of the corporation 
is normally one of the tasks within the wide range of the board’s pow-
ers,9 the board is unlikely to bring a suit against one of its members or 
against an officer, whom the board appointed and who works under the 
board’s supervision.10 Against this conflict of interests, the derivative suit 
provides a safety valve by allowing shareholders to push the corporation 
into litigation.11 Much of Delaware case law revolves around the circum-
stances under which directors can avoid a suit. Even when shareholders 
have good intentions and their claims are likely to succeed, these suits 
may not be in the best interest of the corporation.12 
There is strong evidence that the number of derivative suits in the 
United States is quite large, however, the suits are outnumbered by 
shareholder class actions—which are brought for personal claims of all 
shareholders13—and by securities class actions. For example, Thompson 
and Thomas report that, in 1998 and 1999, 824 class actions, 87 individ-
ual direct actions, and 137 derivative actions were brought in Delaware 
based on alleged violations of fiduciary duty.14 Nevertheless, the niche 
for derivative actions remains sizeable.15 
                                                                                                  
 7. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639 (1987); see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 811 (Del. 1984). 
 8. Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability within the 
Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 214 n.56 (2010). 
 9. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011). 
 10. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 
397 (2008); Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[D]irectors and 
officers of a corporation may not hold themselves accountable to the corporation for their 
own wrongdoing.”). 
 11. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Taormina v. 
Taormina Corp., 78 A.2d 473, 475 (Del. Ch. 1951) (“[T]he action is brought as a class 
action . . . on behalf of all other stockholders of the Corporation similarly situated.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 779–85.  
 13. Delaware uses the Tooley test to distinguish between derivative and direct suits 
(which include class actions) on the basis of whether (1) the corporation or shareholders 
allegedly suffered harm, and (2) who would receive the benefit of the remedy. Tooley v. 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004). 
 14. E.g., Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 168–69 (2004). 
 15. As shown by Mark West, Japan is the one country that seems to have adopted the 
U.S. practice of the derivative suit on a large scale. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders 
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The European evidence is fragmentary, but commentators that discuss 
individual countries uniformly confirm that the number of suits is very 
low.16 In the United Kingdom, an investigation by Armour et al., span-
ning 2004 through 2006, brought to light only twenty-six suits in which 
directors were named as the defendants.17 I am not aware of any system-
atic evidence for Continental Europe. Cheffins and Black report only two 
suits against German supervisory board members before 1997 in which 
                                                                                                  
Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351 (2001) [hereinafter West, Why 
Shareholders Sue]. 
 16. E.g., Kristoffel Grechenig & Michael Sekyra, No derivative shareholder suits in 
Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 16, 16 
(2011) (suggesting a general absence of derivative litigation in Europe). For specific 
countries, see, for example, Lukas Glanzmann, Die Verantwortlichkeitsklage unter Cor-
porate-Governance-Aspekten [The Liability Action under Corporate Governance 
Aspects], 119 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT [ZSR] 137, 174–75 (2000) 
(Switz.) (noting the small significance of shareholder litigation in Switzerland); YVES 
GUYON, 1 DROIT DES AFFAIRES—DROIT COMMERCIAL GÉNÉRAL ET SOCIÉTÉS [BUSINESS 
LAW—COMMERCIAL LAW AND ASSOCIATIONS] ¶ 462 (2003) (Fr.) (stating that the “action 
sociale ut singuli” is rarely exercised); Dominique Schmidt, De quelques règles 
procédurales régissant l’action en responsabilité civile contre les dirigeants de sociétés 
« cotées » in bonis [About severel procedural rules regarding the civil liability action 
against the directors of publicly traded companies], in ÉTUDES DE DROIT PRIVÉ. 
MELANGES OFFERTS À PAUL DIDIER 383, 391 (Michael Germain & Jean Foyer eds., 2008) 
(Fr.) (noting that the number of suits in France is insignificant); Paolo Giudici, Represen-
tative Litigation in Italian Capital Markets: Italian Derivative Suits and (if ever) Securi-
ties Class Actions, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 246, 249 (2009) (“[T]he Italian de-
rivative action exists on paper, but not in the real world”); Dario Latella, Shareholder 
Derivative Suits: A Comparative Analysis and the Implications of the European Share-
holders’ Rights Directive, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 307, 319 (2009) (“At present, 
there are no suits exerted in Italy and, therefore, no data available.”); Marcus Lutter, Zur 
Durchsetzung von Schadenersatzansprüchen gegen Organmitglieder [The Enforcement 
of Compensation Claims against Board Members], in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR UWE H. 
SCHNEIDER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 763, 764–65 (Ulrich Burgard, Walther Hadding, Peter 
O. Mülbert, Michael Nietsch & Reinhard Welter eds., 2011) (Ger.) [hereinafter 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR UWE H. SCHNEIDER] (noting that neither “predatory shareholders” not 
plaintiffs bringing legitimate suits have appeared since the 2005 reform of shareholder 
litigation in Germany); Klaus Ulrich Schmolke, Die Aktionärsklage nach § 148 AktG, 
[The Shareholder Action under § 148 AktG], 40 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 398, 402–03 (2011) (Ger.) (explaining that there were only 
three relatively insignificant cases of derivative suits in Germany have been reported 
since the 2005 reform). 
 17. John Armour, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Richard Nolan, Private Enforce-
ment of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the 
United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 687, 699 (2009). 
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damages were awarded at trial.18 Ulmer reports only two published Ger-
man cases awarding damages on the basis of a submission by sharehold-
ers between 1965 and 1999.19 Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques, and I 
began to compile a database of published French, German, and Italian 
cases decided between 2000 and 2007 where self-dealing by controlling 
shareholders is alleged. While this can provide us only with a limited 
(and maybe not even the main) subset of derivative suits, it is still inter-
esting to note that we have so far found only two such suits in Germany 
(one of which related to a GmbH, roughly the equivalent of an LLC), 
two in Italy, and one in France.20 There is, however, very good data on 
rescission suits in Germany.21 
1.2 The Tradeoff between Enforcement and Abuse 
Are the effects of shareholder litigation beneficial? Intuitively, corpo-
rate law requires an enforcement mechanism. Directors and officers who 
do not expect sanctions for violating duties of care, loyalty, or good faith 
have little reason to comply with these duties. Generally the decision to 
bring a lawsuit is within the competence of a corporation’s directors,22 
who are unlikely to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation and 
name themselves as defendants.23 Without derivative suits, enforcement 
would be highly improbable, except after a change of the management 
team, e.g. because ownership of the corporation changed or because the 
                                                                                                  
 18. See Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability across 
Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1424 (2006). 
 19. Peter Ulmer, Die Aktionärsklage als Instrument zur Kontrolle des Vorstands- und 
Aufsichtsratshandelns [The Shareholder Action as an Instrument to Control Executive 
and Supervisory Board Actions], 163 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 290, 295 n.19 (1999) (Ger.). 
 20. In fact, in most of the cases in our database judicial recourse was not sought 
through a derivative suit, but in other ways. See infra Section 3.1. 
 21. See infra Section 3.1. 
 22. For France, see, for example, PHILIPPE MERLE & ANNE FAUCHON, DROIT 
COMMERCIAL. SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES [COMMERCIAL LAW: BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS] 
¶ 409 (13th ed. 2009) (Fr.); for Germany, see UWE HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ [STOCK 
CORPORATION ACT] § 147, ¶ 1 (9th ed. 2010) (Ger.) (explaining that normally the man-
agement board and supervisory board act on behalf of the company). 
  On shareholders’ power to pass a binding resolution to litigation, see infra note 50 
and accompanying text. In Spain and Belgium, the law simply states that the shareholder 
meeting decides about liability suits, apparently without explicitly providing for a suit to 
be brought by directors. See LEY DE SOCIEDADES ANÓNIMAS art. 134.1 (B.O.E. 1989, 
1564) (Spain); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS [COMPANY CODE] art. 561 (Belg.). 
 23. E.g., Arad Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions: A Re-Examination of Costs and 
Fees as Incentives to Commence Litigation, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 345, 367 (2004). 
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old board was forced to resign after a scandal or the company’s insol-
vency.24 Boards of directors are typically not inclined to sue officers of 
the corporation, even if the officers are not members of the board. 
The same holds in two-tier board models such as the German model. 
Under German law, the supervisory board represents the corporation vis-
à-vis members of the management board.25 While the separation of the 
two boards is intended to avoid conflicts of interest resulting from an 
overlap between the management and oversight functions, lawsuits 
against incumbent boards are still not frequent. The obvious reasons are 
that the supervisory board is also responsible for the appointment of 
management board members,26 and that supervisory directors at least 
appear to be indirectly responsible for decisions of the management or-
gan they are expected to monitor.27 Decisions that give rise to litigation 
are, therefore, likely to shed a bad light on the supervisory board and 
may even lead to liability for poor oversight.28 The same applies when 
the potential defendant is a supervisory board member, in which case 
management, representing the company, is equally unlikely to bite the 
hand that feeds it.29 Interlocking directorates and inevitable social rela-
tionships between directors further widen the enforcement gap.30 
                                                                                                  
 24. See Giudici, supra note 16, at 248–49 (recounting that liability against directors 
was largely unheard of outside of insolvency before Italy introduced derivative suits in 
1998); Michel Germain, Les droits des minoritaires (droit français des sociétés) [Minor-
ity Rights (French Company Law)], 54 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 
[RIDC] [INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW] 401, 409 (2002) (Fr.) (pointing 
out that liability suits are usually only brought after a change at the helm). 
 25. See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] at 1089, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 22, 
2011, BGBL. I at 3044, § 112 (Ger.). Regarding representation in the case of litigation 
against members of the management board, see, for example, Mathias Habersack, in 2 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ [MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE STOCK 
CORPORATION ACT], § 112, ¶ 17 (Wulf Goette & Mathias Habersack eds., 3d ed. 2008). 
 26. AktG § 84 (Ger.). 
 27. See AktG § 111(1) (Ger.); Hans C. Hirt, The Review of the Role and Effectiveness 
of Non-Executive Directors: A Critical Assessment with Particular Reference to the 
German Two-tier Board System: Part 1, 14 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 245, 254 
(2003) [hereinafter Hirt, The Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Di-
rectors] (describing structural interdependence of the two boards). 
 28. E.g., HANS C. HIRT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN BRITAIN AND 
GERMANY 274–75 (2004). 
 29. See Hans C. Hirt, The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties pursuant to the Aktienge-
setz: Present Law and Reform in Germany: Part 1, 16 INT’L COMPANY & COMM. L. REV. 
179, 185 (2005) [hereinafter Hirt, The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties]. 
 30. See Hirt, The Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, 
supra note 27, at 253–54; Susanne Kalss, Shareholder Suits: Common Problems, Differ-
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Shareholder derivative litigation is one possible way of filling this gap. 
The individual shareholder’s incentive to sue, however, is weak. A po-
tential plaintiff will only benefit from a successful suit in proportion to 
his share in the company, while the remaining benefits accrue to other 
shareholders. The plaintiff has to bear the time investment of dealing 
with a suit and possibly the cost. Derivative suits are, therefore, often 
said to produce a public good, the production of which may need to be 
subsidized if derivative suits are thought to have beneficial effects.31 
Shareholder litigation, however, may not always be in the interest of 
the corporation or shareholders as a group. Even if there is a possible 
basis for liability, the likelihood of success and the potential award may 
be too small to make spending money and the executives’ time worth-
while for the corporation.32 Furthermore, a suit may create negative pub-
licity that reduces sales or causes skepticism among suppliers and cus-
tomers. Weighing the pros and cons against each other, the decision to 
litigate looks very much like other business decisions usually taken by 
management. Boards typically possess superior information, in compari-
son to shareholders, as to whether a suit would be advisable. This is why 
one can arguably consider the choice to bring a lawsuit a business deci-
sion—one that warrants the protection of the business judgment rule—at 
least as long as the decision maker is not subject to a conflict of interest. 
U.S. corporate law developed the “demand requirement” to strike a bal-
ance between the business judgment inherently required in the decision 
to litigate and conflicts of interest arising from the fact that potential de-
fendants are directors.33 A potential plaintiff in a derivative suit must 
                                                                                                  
ent Solutions and First Steps towards a Possible Harmonization by Means of a European 
Model Code, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 324, 336–37 (2009). 
 31. E.g., Reisberg, supra note 23, at 345, 347–48 (discussing incentives to sue and 
free-riding); Anne van Aaken, Shareholder Suits as Technique of Internalization and 
Control of Management, 68 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 288, 289 (2004) (Ger.) (discussing the public 
good character of derivative suits). 
 32. See, e.g., Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When are Shareholder 
Suits in Shareholder Interests? 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1738 (1994) (discussing litigation cost). 
Besides these costs on the individual level, shareholder litigation may also make it more 
expensive for firms to hire managers. Id. In this case, other shareholders might react to a 
suit by selling. 
 33. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000); see, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 
23.1 (West 2012); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 2003). 
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show that the plaintiff requested that the board of directors bring a suit or 
had a good reason not to do so.34 
It is conceivable that a suit can be entirely abusive.35 For example, a 
criticism that is sometimes raised in the United States is that derivative 
suits primarily benefit plaintiff law firms36—since the first shareholder 
bringing the suit controls the suit, law firms may engage in a race to the 
courthouse in order to win the prize of controlling the suit.37 The ulterior 
motive of the firm, however, is to receive a contingency fee.38 Most cases 
do not actually go to trial, but instead result in a settlement.39 Under the 
“substantial benefits” test, plaintiff lawyers receive a contingency fee not 
only as a percentage of damages awarded or agreed upon as a settlement, 
but also on the basis of other consequences of the suit. These sometimes 
include corporate governance changes agreed upon with the corpora-
tion’s management, such as the appointment of independent directors to 
the board (the financial benefits of which, if there are indeed any, are 
                                                                                                  
 34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) and equivalent rules under state law, such as 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1984). The complaint has to “state with particularity” the 
efforts the plaintiff made “to obtain the desired action from the directors” or the reasons 
why the plaintiff failed to do so. Under Delaware law, courts will assume that by making 
a demand, plaintiffs concede that demand was not futile. See Speigel v. Buntrock, 571 
A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990). Since directors will typically conclude that a suit is not advis-
able, demand is rarely made. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Common Chal-
lenges Facing Shareholder Suits in Europe and the United States, 6 EUR. COMPANY & 
FIN. L. REV. 348, 352 (2009). Litigation often revolves around the disinterestedness of 
directors’ decision not to sue. See Seth Aronson et al., Shareholder Derivative Actions: 
From Cradle to Grave, 1832 PLI/CORP 163, 209–14 (2010). Under the Aronson-Levine 
test, plaintiffs thus either have to show that the current board “could not reach a disinter-
ested decision with respect to plaintiff’s demand,” or that “there was reasonable doubt 
about whether the board then exercised reasonable business judgment with respect to the 
challenged transaction.” See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 805, 814 (Del. 1984); 
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256. 
 35. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate Gov-
ernance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5–6 (1999). 
 36. See id. at 2, 5–6. 
 37. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 692 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney]. 
 38. See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Share-
holder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 86 (2008); see also Loewenstein, supra 
note 35, at 6 (discussing the motivating force behind filing a derivative action). 
 39. James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 
(1999). 
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nearly impossible to measure).40 Litigation may therefore often com-
mence without merit and be entirely characterized by litigation agency 
cost.41 The controlling law firm has an incentive to settle the case in the 
way not necessarily most beneficial for shareholders, but rather to maxi-
mize the firm’s own benefit. 42 
But even in light of this problem, one could argue that litigation with-
out merit in the specific case may create beneficial general deterrence. 
Managers and directors will have stronger incentives to shy away from 
anything that remotely resembles a violation of corporate law because it 
could lead to a suit, and consequently negative publicity and the hassle of 
legal proceedings. Contingency fees—or any other reward obtained by 
an “abusive” lawyer or plaintiff—could be seen as a reward needed to 
incentivize possible plaintiffs to monitor corporate actions. Abusive law-
suits might actually be socially valuable because only they create a suffi-
cient deterrent effect. 
1.3 Continental European Models of Derivative Litigation 
Despite the general perception that derivative suits are rare in Conti-
nental Europe, they are, in principle, available in all countries surveyed 
here with the exception of the Netherlands.43 (Dutch law has developed 
another enforcement model that will be discussed in Part 3.3.) Admit-
tedly, some countries were relative latecomers to the concept. Belgium 
only introduced derivative litigation in 1991,44 and Italy did so for listed 
firms only as part of a securities law reform in 1998.45 The Italian 
                                                                                                  
 40. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). 
 41. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 37, at 679–80. 
 42. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 959 (Del. Ch. 2010); Cof-
fee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 37, at 690. 
 43. STEVEN R. SCHUIT, BARBARA BIER, LEONARD G. VERBURG & JAN A. TER WISCH, 
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE NETHERLANDS 155 (Steven R. Schuit ed., 2d ed. 
2002). 
 44. The relevant section of the law today is CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 562 (Belg.). The 
suit was first introduced with the Lois coordonnées sur les sociétés commerciales [Bel-
gian Company Code] art. 66bis, of July 26, 1991, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Ga-
zette of Belgium] (Belg.). Alexia Bertrand & Arnaud Coibion, Shareholder Suits against 
the Directors of a Company, against other Shareholders and against the Company itself 
under Belgian Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 270, 282–83 (2009) (discussing 
reasons for the introduction). 
 45. Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58 (It.); TESTO UNICO IN MATERIA DI 
INTERMEDIAZIONE FINANZIARIA [T.U.I.F.] [RULES AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING STOCK 
MARKET TRADING] art. 129, D. Lgs. n.58 (It.). The corporation could settle lawsuits un-
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mechanism was expanded to all stock corporations—or società per azio-
ni—including those that are not publicly traded, in 2003. Elsewhere, de-
rivative suits or very close equivalents have been around for much 
longer. For example, France was the trailblazer and introduced the so-
called action sociale ut singuli in 1867,46 while Germany’s slightly dif-
ferent minority enforcement mechanism followed suit in 1884.47 
The litigation models of France and Switzerland, where the derivative 
suit is seen as an individual shareholder right and the law simply states 
that a corporate liability suit can be brought by a shareholder on behalf of 
the corporation,48 are probably the closest to the United States’ model. In 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain, enforcement is a collective 
right of shareholders that can be imposed on the corporation by a binding 
shareholder resolution.49 The power of the majority is compromised by 
the right of a qualified minority to set litigation in motion with court ap-
proval.50 The Belgian, Italian, and Spanish enforcement mechanisms can 
                                                                                                  
less a minority of 5% objected in the shareholder meeting. Article 129 has been elimi-
nated in consequence of the introduction of the derivative suit in corporate law. 
 46. Loi du 24 juillet 1867 sur les Sociétés [Law of July 24, 1867 on Companies], arts. 
17, 39 (Fr.) (permitting a minority of 5% to bring a derivative suit). In spite of the 5% 
threshold, the courts soon found that this provision did not limit the individual sharehold-
ers right to bring a derivative suit; it merely set out limitations to the circumstances under 
which a group of shareholders could collaborate to sue jointly (in order to save cost). See 
C. HOUPIN & H. BOSVIEUX, 2 TRAITÉ GÉNÉRAL DES SOCIÉTÉS CIVILES ET COMMERCIALES ET 
DES ASSOCIATIONS ¶ 1431 (6th ed. 1929) (citing a list of cases beginning with Cass., 7 
maie 1872, Dal. 72, I, 273 (It.)). 
 47. See Hirt, The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties, supra note 29, at 184. 
 48. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-252 (Fr.); 
OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] Mar. 30, 1911, as amended, art. 756 
(Switz.). Germany follows this model only in the law of corporate groups. See infra notes 
185–84 and accompanying text. In France, it is usually assumed that the derivative suit 
can only be brought if the corporation failed to sue, even though there is no formal de-
mand requirement. See Hans de Wulf, Direct shareholder suits for damages based on 
reflective loss, in 1 FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 24. 
AUGUST 2010, 1537, 1558 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2010). 
 49. Depending on the respective board structure, shareholders that do not fulfill the 
standing requirements to sue can of course alert the board, supervisory board, or board of 
auditors of possible wrongdoing, although this will of course not help much in many 
cases. See, e.g., CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] art. 2393(3) (It.) (permitting the board of auditors to 
sue). 
 50. See C.C. arts. 2393(1), 2364(4) (It.); AktG § 147(1) (Ger.); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS 
art. 561 (Belg.); AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG] [STOCK CORPORATION ACT] § 134(1) (Austria); 
Ley de Sociedades Anónimas art. 134.4 (B.O.E. 1989, 1564) (Spain) (providing that a 
minority of 5% can ask for the convocation of a shareholder meeting to decide about a 
liability suit, and can bring the suit if (1) the board does not convene the shareholder 
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be qualified as providing for actual derivative suits, even though Belgian 
and Italian laws require that shareholders must appoint representatives 
(of plaintiff shareholders).51 The same is true for the German model in-
troduced with the Business Integrity Act of 2005,52 which for the first 
time permits a “real” derivative suit in which shareholders personally 
enforce a claim.53 The old German model, which is still available as an 
alternative,54 and the equivalent Austrian provisions, only create a right 
for a qualified minority to petition a court to appoint a special representa-
tive of the corporation to pursue liability claims against directors.55 The 
                                                                                                  
meeting, (2) the company does not bring a suit in spite of a decision in the shareholder 
meeting within a month, or (3) shareholders decide not to bring a suit). 
  The right to enforce claims is only one of a whole range of rights that qualified 
minority shareholders have in many Continental European jurisdictions. The role of 
minimum ownership requirements will be discussed in Part 2.1. While fiduciary duties or 
equivalent doctrines applying to controlling shareholders are generally recognized, I am 
not aware of litigation that would allege a breach for a controlling shareholders’ failure to 
vote in favor of a liability suit. See Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, 
Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, 
Germany, and Italy, 4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 491, 500–02 (2007). 
 51. CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 565 (Belg.) (requiring that plaintiffs unanimously elect a 
representative to pursue the suit who can be a “shareholder or not”); C.C. art. 2393-bis(4) 
(It.) (requiring that plaintiffs elect one or more representatives by a majority vote). In 
Italy, shareholders also control the suit, since the law allows them to abandon or settle the 
claim. C.C. art. 2393-bis(6) (It.); see Luca Enriques & Federico M. Mucciarelli, L’azione 
sociale di responsabilità da parte delle minoranze [Derivative Action brought by a Mi-
nority], in 2 IL NUOVO DIRITTO DELLE SOCIETÀ [THE NEW CORPORATE LAW] 861, 878–79 
(Pietro Abadessa & Giuseppe B. Portale eds., 2006) (It.) (criticizing that a majority 
shareholder could inhibit litigation by suing separately and electing a compliant represen-
tative). 
 52. AktG § 148 I, as amended by Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisie-
rung des Anfechtungsrechts [UMAG], Sept. 22, 2005, BGBL. I at 2802 (Ger.). 
 53. Regarding additional procedural hurdles, see infra notes 65–67 and accompany-
ing text. 
 54. See AktG § 147(2) (Ger.). 
 55. Regarding the requirement to first push for the enforcement of the claim in the 
meeting, see UWE HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ [STOCK CORPORATION ACT] § 147, ¶ 4 (6th ed. 
2004); Henning Schröer, in 4 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 147, ¶ 32 
(Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., 2d ed. 2004) (Ger.). Before 1998, a minority of 
10% or a stated capital of €1 million could request the appointment of a special represen-
tative. Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich [KonTraG] [Con-
trol and Transparency Act], Mar. 3, 1998, BGBL. I Nr.24 S. 786 (Ger.), reduced the own-
ership threshold to 5%/€500,000 for cases where petitioners were able to establish facts 
indicating dishonesty or serious violations of the law or the corporate charter (AktG §147 
III (Ger.) (old version)) and for the first time permitted the minority right to be exercised 
directly without first having to go through the shareholder meeting. Shareholders could 
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new German framework, for the first time, gives shareholders control 
over the suit,56 although the corporation can decide to take over a pend-
ing suit at any time.57 It is also the only Continental European country to 
adopt the demand requirement from the United States’ model.58 
2. THE ANNA KARENINA PRINCIPLE: EXPLANATIONS FOR THE ABSENCE 
OF SUITS 
I focus on four issues to explain the scarcity of derivative litigation in 
spite of its availability in principle. In analogy to the Anna Karenina 
principle, countries need to “get it right” in at least four dimensions to 
allow shareholder suits to proliferate. The four dimensions are as fol-
lows: there must be favorable standing requirements that do not include a 
minimum ownership threshold (Section 2.1); the litigation risk must be 
allocated favorably to overcome minority shareholders’ rational apathy 
(Section 2.2); potential plaintiffs must have sufficient access to informa-
tion to litigate (Section 2.3); and the enforcement model must make it 
possible for shareholders to derivatively sue potential wrongdoers, which 
not only includes directors, but also controlling shareholders (Section 
2.4). 
2.1 Minimum Share Ownership Requirements 
A number of Continental European jurisdictions require that share-
holders (or groups of shareholders) hold a qualified percentage of the 
company’s shares or a specified amount of capital to bring a derivative 
suit. Percentage limits can be rationalized as a screening mechanism 
against abusive lawsuits on the grounds that the incentive for a share-
holder with a small amount of shares to bring a legitimate suit is very 
likely small. Given that any shareholder’s benefits from the results of a 
successful suit consist only of a proportionate share in the rise of the 
value of the corporation, it seems hard to imagine why a shareholder 
                                                                                                  
also vote to appoint a special representative, presumably to pursue the claim more effec-
tively. AktG § 147 II (Ger.). Currently, the appointment of a special representative can be 
requested by a 10% /€1 million minority.  
  Austrian law, which shares a historical origin with German law because of the 
introduction of the 1937 AktG in Austria, still provides essentially the same in AKTG 
§ 134 (Austria). 
 56. Hirt, The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties, supra note 29, at 188. 
 57. AKTG § 147(3) (Austria). 
 58. See AktG § 148(1)(2) (Ger.). 
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with only a few shares would sue for a legitimate reason.59 For a small 
investor, a suit would seem to be rational only when the investor can 
somehow coerce management into an abusive settlement that constitutes 
an effective bribe to make the investor go away, i.e., the litigation 
equivalent of greenmail.60 Theory cannot explain what particular per-
centage should provide the cutoff, which could be set at 1%, 5%, 10%, or 
any other number with almost equal justification. A plaintiff’s motives 
are presumably legitimate when the benefits of the lawsuit, multiplied by 
the probability of its success, exceed the costs of litigation, including 
nonmonetary cost. Any percentage limit is, to some extent, arbitrary and 
can preclude some legitimate suits. The requirement to retain a relatively 
large number of shares while the suit is pending may act as a further de-
terrent.61 
Grechenig and Sekyra suggest that percentage limits are to blame for 
the absence of derivative suits in Continental Europe.62 Their mathemati-
cal model captures a simple intuition: in order to avoid a lawsuit, poten-
tial defendant managers only need to deal with those shareholders above 
the applicable threshold. In order to “bribe” these large shareholders, 
managers would have to offer these shareholders an advantage that ex-
ceeds their losses from managerial wrongdoing. Large shareholders, 
therefore, do not monitor management, but become accomplices of man-
agement in actions exploiting investors whose share is below the thresh-
old.63 
                                                                                                  
 59. E.g., Kalss, supra note 30, at 341 (“The function of a minimum share stake re-
quirement is to impose part of the financial risk to be borne by the company on the 
claimant and, therefore, to reduce the economic motivation for suits brought for purposes 
of extortion.”); Schmolke, supra note 16, at 425. The assumption implicit in this argu-
ment is that there are significant, non-reimburseable costs that do not increase in the 
plaintiff’s share in the firm. 
 60. Relatedly, it is sometimes argued that small shareholders are mere investors with-
out a long-term interest in the firm, who have no entrepreneurial interest and can express 
their dissatisfaction by selling his share. See Mathias M. Siems, Welche Auswirkungen 
hat das neue Verfolgungsrecht der Aktionärsminderheit?, 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [ZVGLRWISS] 376, 385 (2005) (Ger.) (criticizing 
this argument). 
 61. Giudici, supra note 16, at 251 (discussing the Italian case). 
 62. See Grechenig & Sekyra, supra note 16, at 16–17. 
 63. See also Alexander Stremitzer, Plaintiffs Exploiting Plaintiffs 11–12 (Yale Law & 
Econ. Research Paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1085282 (reaching 
practically the same result under different assumptions about bargaining power between 
managers and minority shareholders). One could imagine that managers permit large 
shareholders to engage in harmful self-dealing transactions, while these shareholders will 
allow managers to obtain illicit private benefits. This assumption seems to be in line with 
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In recent years, Germany and Italy have reduced minimum ownership 
thresholds. The traditional German enforcement mechanism required a 
qualified minority of 10% or DM 2,000,000 until 1998, when it was low-
ered to 5% or €500,000 for cases where shareholders could establish 
facts indicating dishonesty or serious violations of the law or the corpo-
rate charter.64 The derivative suit introduced in 2005 requires only 1% or 
€100,000.65 To prevent abusive litigation, the German legislature intro-
duced a special judicial “lawsuit admission procedure,” or Klagezulas-
sungsverfahren, during the course of which plaintiffs must show that 
they demanded that directors bring the suit.66 Shareholders have to estab-
lish facts indicating dishonesty or serious violations of the law or the 
corporate charter, and the court must determine whether litigation would 
be in the interest of the company before allowing it to proceed beyond 
this stage.67 
In 1998, when derivative suits were introduced, Italian law started out 
with a 5% threshold.68 Since the mechanism was never used,69 the 2003 
reform eliminated the six month ownership requirement and extended it 
to unlisted stock corporations. In unlisted corporations, the suit is re-
stricted to shareholders owning at least 20%, unless the corporate charter 
provides an even higher threshold of up to 33.3%.70 For publicly traded 
                                                                                                  
anecdotal evidence about financial scandals. In concentrated ownership systems, block-
holders tend to be involved in wrongdoing. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate 
Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ, 21 OX. REV. ECON. POL’Y 198 (2005). In a 
dispersed ownership firm where all stakes are below the threshold, there will be no suits 
unless shareholders are able to coordinate. 
 64. AktG § 147 III (Ger.) (old version). In other words, the burden of proof was more 
severe for smaller shareholders. 
 65. AktG § 148 I, as amended by UMAG (Ger.). 
 66. AktG § 148 II, as amended by UMAG (Ger.). Among other things, it must be 
shown that the firm failed to bring a suit within a reasonable period after demand was 
made by shareholders. A “reasonable” period seems to be about two months. See 
HÜFFER, supra note 22, § 148, ¶ 7. 
 67. To be precise, the court must determine whether there are indications that the 
company suffered damages from dishonesty or from serious violations of the law or the 
charter, and whether a suit would be contrary to the preponderating interest of the com-
pany AktG § 148 II, as amended by UMAG (Ger.). The corporation can at any time de-
cide to pick up the suit. AktG § 148 III (Ger.). 
 68. Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent 
Italian Reform and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective 
Regulatory Competition, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 207, 246–47 (2005). The law 
also stipulated a minimum ownership period of six months. Id. 
 69. Id. at 247. 
 70. C.C. art. 2393bis(1) (It.). 
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firms, the threshold was reduced from 5% to 2.5% in 2006,71 again be-
cause derivative suits failed to emerge in practice.72 
Whereas Belgian law also only requires 1% or a nominal capital share 
of €1,250,000 for a derivative suit,73 the thresholds are higher in Spain 
(5%)74 and Austria (10%).75 Table 1 provides a summary. 
 
Country Minimum 
ownership 
Enforcement model Additional notes 
Austria 10% enforcement by special 
representative of the 
corporation 
5% if special audits re-
vealed incriminating infor-
mation 
Belgium 1% or 
€1,250,00
0 
derivative suit with man-
datory shareholder repre-
sentative  
 
France none derivative suit groups of shareholders and 
shareholder associations 
need to pass thresholds to 
bring joint suits 
Germany 1% or 
€100,000 
derivative suit 
 
demand requirement and 
judicial “admission proce-
dure” 
shareholders have to estab-
lish facts indicating cases of 
dishonesty or serious viola-
tions of the law or the cor-
porate charter 
 10% enforcement by special 
representative of the 
corporation 
***special rules for corpo-
rate groups (see section 2.4) 
Italy 2.5% 
(listed) or 
20% 
derivative suit with man-
datory shareholder repre-
sentative 
 
The  
Netherlands 
10% or 
€225,000 
no derivative suit, but 
“inquiry proceedings” 
(see section 3.3) 
 
Spain 5% derivative suit  
Switzerland none derivative suit  
Table 1: Minimum ownership thresholds for minority enforcement of 
directors’ liability in Continental European jurisdictions 
                                                                                                  
 71. C.C. art. 2393bis(2), as modified by Legge 28 dicembre 2005, n. 262 (It.). 
 72. See Giudici, supra note 16, at 250. 
 73. CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 562 (Belg.). 
 74. Ley de Sociedades Anónimas art. 134(4) (B.O.E. 1989, 1564) (Spain) (referring 
to art. 100). 
 75. AKTG § 134(1) (Austria). 
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The percentage limit theory cannot explain the cases of France and 
Switzerland, where—as in the United States and Japan—individual 
shareholders can enforce liability claims against directors without hold-
ing a minimum stake. These laws also do not have the additional proce-
dural hurdles of German law, such as the demand requirement and ad-
mission procedure.76 The German situation is not well explained by the 
theory, since there is a special derivative mechanism available to every 
shareholder in the law of corporate groups, but the mechanism has also 
failed to produce litigation.77 French law does not provide an ownership 
threshold for individual plaintiffs, but does so for groups of shareholders 
suing jointly78 and for qualifying shareholder associations.79 In these 
cases, the threshold amounts to at least 0.5% or 1%, respectively.80 The 
collective mechanisms are preferable to the individual suit for reasons of 
litigation costs,81 but the advantage is not big enough to overcome the 
problems set by the threshold and the lack of incentives for small share-
holders to sue. 
                                                                                                  
 76. Giudici, supra note 16, at 252, 253 n.38. Japan also never had a threshold, and 
still suits appeared only in the 1990s. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 15, at 352 
(describing the emergence of derivative suits in Japan). 
 77. See infra Section 2.4. 
 78. See C. COM. art. L. 225-169 (Fr.). The exact threshold is computed by taking 4% 
of the first €750,000 of the firm’s capital, 2.5% of the amount between €750,000 and 
€7,500,000, 1% of the amount between €7,500,000 and €15,000,000, and 0.5% for any-
thing above that. Thus, the larger the firm’s capital, the smaller the required percentage. 
 79. Qualifying associations can collectively exercise the certain shareholder rights, 
such as the convocation of the shareholder meeting, putting items on the agenda, demand 
the resignation of auditors, submit questions to directors, and, most interestingly for us, 
bring suits against directors/administrators. See id. art. L. 225-120, I (Fr.); ANNE 
CHAVÉRIAT, ALAIN COURET & BRUNO ZABALA, MÉMENTO PRATIQUE FRANCIS LEVEBVRE: 
SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES 2010, ¶ 17903 (Francis Lefebrvre ed., 41st ed. 2009). 
 80. See C. COM. arts. L. 225-252 & L. 225-120 (Fr.). The members of a qualifying 
association must own a minimum number of shares depending on the firm’s legal capital. 
See id. art. L. 225-120. If the firm’s capital is below €750,000, the required amount is 
5%; between €750,000 and €4,500,000 it is 4%, between €4,500,000 and €7,500,000 it is 
3%, between €7,500,000 and €15,000,000 it is 2%, and above that it is 1%. See id. French 
law does not have a demand requirement. See de Wulf, supra note 48, at 1558. 
 81. Since several shareholders suing in parallel cannot delegate a member of their 
group as a joint representative (“nul ne plaid par procureur”), court fees are effectively 
multiplied by the number of suing shareholders. Groups of shareholders or shareholder 
associations can allows spreading cost across shareholders. See RAPHAËL CONTIN, LE 
CONTRÔLE DE LA GESTION DES SOCIÉTÉS ANONYMES ¶ 526 (1975) (Fr.); GUYON, supra note 
16, at 496; Germain, supra note 24, at 409; see also MAURICE COZIAN, ALAIN VIANDIER 
& FLORENCE DEBOISSY, DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS ¶ 619 (22d ed. 2009); MERLE & FAUCHON, 
supra note 22, ¶ 410; CHAVARÉT ET AL., supra note 79, ¶ 2404. 
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In spite of these doubts, policymakers regularly obsess about percent-
age thresholds.82 Given the highly dispersed ownership structure in the 
United States, it is likely that even a small percentage threshold would 
kill most suits in publicly traded firms. It is equally unlikely that elimi-
nating ownership thresholds would result in derivative litigation spread-
ing across the European continent. A non-trivial ownership threshold 
seems to be an exclusionary criterion that will prevent the emergence of 
a culture of derivative litigation, but the absence of one does not guaran-
tee its spread. 
2.2. Costs and the Allocation of Litigation Risk 
2.2.1. Law Firm Driven Litigation in the United States 
Besides ownership thresholds, the most frequently discussed reason for 
the scarcity of derivative litigation is the absence of incentives to bring 
derivative suits.83 In most publicly traded U.S. firms, which usually have 
dispersed share ownership, one would expect individual shareholders to 
have little, if any, incentive to sue given that they only draw a very small 
advantage while being burdened with a potentially substantial cost.84 The 
“American Rule” in civil procedure, which requires that each party pays 
its own cost regardless of the outcome, could in theory deter some pro-
spective suits that have a high probability of success.85 Losers are only 
required to pay winners in rare cases where courts believe that bringing a 
suit was clearly abusive.86 
The high frequency of derivative (and other shareholder) litigation is 
typically credited to the entrepreneurial and specialized plaintiff bar. This 
bar actually has quite a strong incentive to bring derivative suits given 
that contingency fees resulting from an award or settlement could be as 
high as one third of the amount.87 Even when the settlement does not 
contain a monetary award, and only requires changing the firm’s corpo-
rate governance practices (e.g., more independent directors), the law firm 
can receive a considerable award under the “substantial benefits” doc-
                                                                                                  
 82. See, e.g., Giudici, supra note 16, at 250 (reporting that the Italian legislator of 
2006 thought that 5% was too high); Cheffins & Black, supra note 18, at 1425 (consider-
ing the former German 10% threshold as a reason for the absence of litigation). 
 83. Erickson, supra note 38, at 100. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970). 
 86. E.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 34, at 355. 
 87. See Erickson, supra note 38, at 101. 
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trine.88 Specialized law firms therefore only need to find a suitable plain-
tiff and sometimes actually hold a stock portfolio to be able to sue once 
they hear about a possible claim.89 This situation may result in a “race to 
the courthouse” between law firms since, traditionally, the first firm to 
file is assigned the role of lead counsel in the case and thus receives most 
of the fee.90 However, since about the year 2000, Delaware courts have 
begun to rely on a variety of factors to determine lead counsel, including 
the size of the plaintiff’s stake and the quality of the pleadings filed.91 
While this may marginally diminish suits or induce plaintiffs to take 
cases out of Delaware, this further illustrates that the incentive to sue 
rests almost entirely with the law firm.92 
2.2.2. The “Loser Pays” Principle 
European countries generally apply what in the United States is often 
called the “English Rule”: the losing party has to reimburse the winning 
party for litigation costs.93 Since the outcome of a lawsuit is rarely cer-
tain, it is often suggested that the most important factor deterring deriva-
tive suits is that shareholders will not be willing to take the risk of having 
                                                                                                  
 88. Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 320 (1968); see also Mills, 396 
U.S. at 395–96 (noting that “an award of counsel fees, regardless of whether the benefit is 
pecuniary in nature” may be justified from a derivative suit where the corporation re-
ceived a “substantial benefit”); Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1165 
(Del. 1989) (discussing the term “corporate benefit”). Note that the Delaware courts were 
long known to be more generous to plaintiff’s attorneys than other courts, who often 
relied on the “lodestar” approach, which is based on the number of hours invested multi-
plied by the lawyer’s hourly fee and adjusted by a factor depending on various character-
istics of the case, like risk. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1449 (N.D. Cal. 
1994); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22 (1991). There is evidence that Delaware has started to act more 
parsimoniously recently and has hence lost market share in litigation. See John Armour, 
Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act 31–35 (Univ. Cambridge 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-04, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677400 (discussing attorney’s fees in Delaware). 
 89. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 37, at 682. 
 90. See id. at 692. 
 91. See Armour et al., supra note 88, at 35–43. 
 92. E.g., Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 37, at 669. 
 93. E.g. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005, 
BGBL I S. 3202, § 91 (Ger.); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [CODE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE] art. 696 (Fr.); Codice di Procedura civile [C.p.c.] art. 91 (It.); 
SCHWEIZERISCHE ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [C.P.C.] [SWISS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 
106(1) (Switz.); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 41(1) 
(Austria); CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] § 1017 (Belg.). 
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to pay for the defendants’ fees.94 The argument appears persuasive at first 
glance. Fees often depend on the complexity of the case, which is high if 
it involves intricate business issues. Moreover, to the extent that fees de-
pend on the amount in dispute, court fees will also be very high in a de-
rivative suit given the high value at stake in such suits.95 
From a theoretical perspective, the argument is not entirely persuasive. 
The obvious objection is that the effects of the English Rule cut both 
ways; a plaintiff not only bears the risk of having to reimburse the defen-
dant if the suit fails, but also benefits from being reimbursed in the case 
of success. Thus, the rule’s overall effect is to increase the dollar amount 
subject to litigation risk. Instead of receiving an amount between zero 
and the sum sought in the suit, the plaintiff’s potential payoff varies from 
the negative amount of the defendant’s cost to the sum sought plus the 
plaintiff’s own cost. With the greater spread in possible payoffs, the ef-
fect of the English Rule is to dilute “the value of low-probability-of-
prevailing cases” and enhancing “the value of high-probability-of-
prevailing cases.”96 Winners’ cost reimbursement favors plaintiffs who 
know for sure that they have a clear-cut case over those who are unlikely 
to prevail. The rule should, therefore, deter frivolous shareholder litiga-
tion, while encouraging meritorious suits. 
Moreover, European reimbursement systems are often closer to the 
American Rule in practice than in theory. In several countries, including 
Germany and Italy, reimbursement is limited to court fees plus expenses 
for lawyers, according to the official tariff promulgated by the bar asso-
ciation.97 Reimbursement by the loser is even more limited in France;98 
                                                                                                  
 94. E.g., Luca Enriques, The Comparative Anatomy of Corporate Law, 52 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1011, 1024 (2004) (reviewing REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004)) [hereinafter 
Enriques, The Comparative Anatomy of Corporate Law]; Reisberg, supra note 23, at 
348–49 (“[T]he American treatment of fees in such actions provides significantly lower 
disincentives to prospective plaintiffs than does the English Rule.”); Cheffins & Black, 
supra note 18, at 1425; Cox & Thomas, supra note 34, at 357. 
 95. E.g., Lutter, supra note 16, at 765 (criticizing that a high amount in dispute may 
deter German shareholders from suing). Technically, the court has some discretion in 
setting the amount in dispute under German law. Gerichtskostengesetz [GKG] [Court 
Fees Act], Aug. 4, 2009, BGBL. I at 2491, § 53. 
 96. Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 259, 301 
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
 97. For Germany, see Martin Giebel, in 1 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 91, ¶ 49 (Thomas Rauscher & Peter Wax eds., 3d ed. 2008) 
(Ger.); ZPO § 91 II (Ger.) (first sentence). For Italy, see Giudici, supra note 16, at 253–
54 (noting that the Italian civil procedure code applies the English rule for legal ex-
penses). For Austria, see ZPO § 41(2) (Austria). 
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while court fees are usually reimbursed, lawyers’ fees normally are not. 
These are automatically borne by the losing party only when retention of 
an attorney is mandatory,99 which is generally not the case in commercial 
courts, where corporate cases are litigated.100 French judges can grant 
lawyers’ fees to the winning party under equitable considerations,101 but, 
if fees are granted in practice, the amount tends to be much lower than 
what lawyers actually charged.102 
Several jurisdictions have special rules regarding litigation costs for 
shareholder derivative suits, all of which slightly improve the position of 
plaintiff shareholders compared to the basic “loser pays” principle. For 
example, under the post-2005 German law,103 the minority shareholder’s 
risk is initially cabined to the cost of the special judicial procedure decid-
ing the admission of the derivative suit. At this stage, the amount in dis-
pute is capped at €500,000, which usually limits court fees to a four-digit 
figure.104 Moreover, the corporation bears the cost if the petition is de-
nied for reasons “in the interest of the company” about which the share-
holder could not know, but which the corporation could have disclosed to 
the shareholder. If the petition actually proceeds to the stage of a deriva-
tive suit, the English Rule applies in principle. However, if the suit is not 
successful or is only partially successful, the corporation has to reim-
                                                                                                  
 98. See Bernard Grelon, Shareholders’ Lawsuits against the Management of a Com-
pany and its Shareholders under French Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 205, 212 
(2009) (explaining that a winning plaintiff shareholder is not fully reimbursed). 
 99. C.P.C. art. 696(7) (Fr.). 
 100. Id. art. 853. 
 101. Id. art. 700. 
 102. E.g., Daniel Landry, Les frais irrépétibles [The Irrecoverable Costs], 2010 LA 
SEMAINE JURIDIQUE ÉDITION GÉNÉRALE [JCP-G] 1288 (Fr.); Raymond Martin, Avocats—
Obligations et prérogatives [Lawyers—Duties and Prerogatives], in JURISCLASSEUR 
PROCÉDURE CIVILE 83–84, ¶ 43 (2011) (Fr.). 
 103. Before 2005, liability claims initiated by minority shareholders were pursued by a 
court-appointed special representative, who was an agent of the corporation and thus paid 
by it. AktG § 147 III (Ger.), before KonTraG (1998); AktG § 147 II, as amended by 
KonTraG (1998–2005). However, the petitioning minority shareholders had to compen-
sate the corporation when litigation cost exceeded the award, and even had to bear court 
fees if the suit was entirely unsuccessful. AktG § 147 IV (Ger.) (until 2005). 
 104. GKG § 53 (Ger.); see Martin Peltzer, Das Zulassungsverfahren nach § 148 AktG 
wird von der Praxis nicht angenommen! Warum? Was nun?, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR UWE H. 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 956–57 (discussing the amount of court fees); see also Car-
sten A. Paul, Derivative Actions under English and German Corporate Law—
Shareholder Participation between the Tension Filled Areas of Corporate Governance 
and Malicious Shareholder Interference, 7 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 81, 102 (2010) 
(suggesting that fees hardly ever exceed €12,000). 
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burse the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff passed the first stage of judgment 
review by claiming false facts and in doing so acted intentionally or with 
gross negligence.105 As a result, a good faith plaintiff should bear little 
risk. 
In most other countries, cost rules are also slightly tweaked in favor of 
plaintiffs. In Italy, the corporation is not only required to pay the victori-
ous plaintiff’s litigation expenses, but also the cost of ascertaining the 
facts that form the basis of the suit.106 In Switzerland and France, the 
court generally has the discretion to diverge from the English Rule in the 
case of an unsuccessful good-faith plaintiff.107 In Belgium, the court can 
require losing shareholders to pay damages to the defendants, but must 
order the company to reimburse damages if the suit is successful.108 In 
Austria, the minority can be required to pay the litigation cost incurred 
by the special representative only if the minority acted intentionally or 
with gross negligence in the pursuit of frivolous litigation.109 
Given these theoretical doubts and the economics of the English Rule, 
it appears that the idea of the English Rule’s deterrent power is based on 
the assumption that shareholder suits have a low probability of winning. 
If that is the case, maybe the United States only has vibrant derivative 
litigation because strike suits are not deterred. Moreover, the increased 
risk created by the English Rule may be hard to absorb for shareholder 
plaintiffs who tend to be worse risk-bearers than large corporations and 
wealthy directors with deep pockets. This issue is likely exacerbated by 
the reality that lawyers’ fees are often not reimbursed beyond a certain 
basic amount, since cases with a complicated corporate fact pattern are 
hard to handle for non-specialized counsel. In spite of ostensively share-
holder-friendly rules, often open-ended standards with respect to cost put 
                                                                                                  
 105. AktG § 148 VI (Ger.). 
 106. C.C. art. 2393-bis(5) (It.); see also Enriques & Mucciarelli, supra note 51, at 887 
(pointing out that Italian law also eliminates the plaintiff’s additional risk that the defen-
dants are judgment proof and therefore cannot reimburse them). 
 107. C.P.C. art. 107(b) (Switz.). The official legislative report explicitly encourages 
judges to do so in cases of derivative suits. SCHWEIZERISCHEN EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT, 
BOTSCHAFT ZUR SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 7297, June 28, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2006/7221.pdf (Switz.) (mentioning the case of a 
small shareholder bringing a derivative suit a possible case where the court may use this 
discretion). Before the enactment of a uniform Swiss Code of Civil Procedure in 2009, 
there was an explicit rule in corporate law. OR, former art. 756(2) (Switz.). In France, the 
court has the same equitable power under C.P.C. art. 696 (Fr.), although this happens 
extremely rarely, and no specific reference to shareholder litigation is made. 
 108. CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 567 (Belg.). 
 109. See AKTG § 135(4)–(5) (Austria). 
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plaintiffs at the mercy of the courts by making reimbursement uncertain. 
Peltzer suggests that, regarding Germany, the cost risk of an admission 
procedure is still too big for small shareholders, in particular when sev-
eral shareholders have to coordinate to surpass the 1% threshold, in 
which case they are jointly and severally liable for cost.110 In the Italian 
context, Giudici criticizes that the court has too much discretion in de-
termining what costs were necessary to establish the facts and are there-
fore reimbursable.111 Similar arguments can be made for other laws that 
rely on the plaintiff’s good faith or degree of negligence to allocate liti-
gation risk. 
Overall, the purported negative effects of the loser pays principle seem 
to be rather an issue of how easy it is to bring a claim, specifically what 
burden of proof needs to be met to survive early stages of litigation or to 
obtain reimbursement with reasonable certainty. In order to facilitate de-
rivative litigation, it may be more promising for European legislatures to 
facilitate information gathering by shareholders instead of switching to 
the American Rule, even if it slightly encourages more risky lawsuits.112 
2.2.3. No Contingency Fees 
Besides the “English Rule,” the other classic difference that could ex-
plain the rarity of derivative suits in Europe is the absence of contin-
gency fees. In contrast to the United States, contingency fees are un-
common and often illegal. Contingency fees have traditionally been re-
jected because they are thought to distort the incentives of lawyers to 
represent clients’ interests.113 Although the cultural aversion to a more 
entrepreneurial view of the legal profession may be receding, this has not 
yet resulted in the emergence of a plaintiff bar comparable to the Ameri-
can one. 
                                                                                                  
 110. Peltzer, supra note 104, at 956–57. 
 111. See Giudici, supra note 16, at 254. 
 112. The issue will be addressed in Section 2.3. 
 113. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Essay, Will Aggregate Litiga-
tion Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 197–99, 199 n.57 (2009) (describing resis-
tance against derivative litigation and mentioning that England and Wales allowed condi-
tional fees since the early 1990s); Tiffany Chieu, Note, Class Actions in the European 
Union?: Importing Lessons Learned from the United States’ Experience into European 
Community Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 123, 148 (2010) (“[W]ith 
the exception of England and Wales, contingency fees are prohibited in EU Member 
States.”). 
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Contingency fees could conceivably kindle desirable litigation, which 
has not eluded the attention of policymakers, scholars, and courts.114 In 
France, the 1996 Marini Report on corporate law discussed the possible 
adoption of contingency fees in the context of class actions, but ulti-
mately did not recommend the introduction of either instrument.115 In 
Germany, the Constitutional Court declared the former blanket prohibi-
tion unconstitutional in 2006.116 Therefore, the law regulating lawyers’ 
fees in Germany had to be amended to permit contingency fees in re-
stricted circumstances, specifically when a plaintiff would otherwise be 
prevented from pursuing the plaintiff’s rights for economic reasons.117 
However, lawyers in Germany are not permitted to use contingency fees 
as a general strategy,118 but only to permit indignant plaintiffs to pursue 
claims.119 In July 2006, Italy took some steps towards results-based com-
pensation for lawyers.120 The Italian law governing lawyers’ ethics now 
permits lawyers’ fees to be made dependent on the achievement of speci-
fied goals,121 and the former prohibition in the civil code has been elimi-
                                                                                                  
 114. See, e.g., Gerard Hertig & Joseph A. McCahery, Company and Takeover Law 
Reform in Europe: Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition?, 4 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 179, 193 (2003) (suggesting that contingency fees could improve cor-
porate law enforcement in the EU). 
 115. PHILIPPE MARINI, LA MODERNISATION DU DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS [THE 
MODERNIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW] 93–94 (1996), reprinted in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS M-113 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wy-
meersch eds., 1997). The legal basis for the prohibition in France is Loi 71-1130 du 31 
décembre 1971 portant réforme de certaines professions judiciaires et juridiques [Refor-
ming Certain Judicial and Legal Professorions], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], art. 10(3) (Fr.). 
 116. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Dec. 12, 2006, 1 BvR 2576/04, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 878, 
2007 (Ger.) (requiring the legislature to amend the law by June 30, 2008). 
 117. Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz [RVG] [Attorney Fees Act] § 4a, as amended by 
Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Erfolgshonorars, July 1, 2008, BGBL. I at 1001, art. 2, § 4a 
(Ger.). 
 118. See Joachim Teubel, in RECHTSANWALTSVERGÜTUNGSGESETZ § 4a, ¶ 24 (Hans-
Joachim Mayer & Ludwig Kroiß eds., 4th ed. 2009) (Ger.). 
 119. Id. § 4a, ¶¶ 30–34 (explaining that contingency fees may not be used to let suits 
go forward that would otherwise not be brought because of the plaintiff’s risk aversion 
and a small probability of success); see also Schmolke, supra note 16, at 409 (explaining 
that contingency fees are not permissible in this context). 
 120. See Decreto Legislativo 4 luglio 2006, n. 223, in G.U. 4 luglio 2006, n. 153, as 
modified by D. Lgs. 4 agosto 2006, n. 248, in G.U. 11 agosto 2006, n. 186 (It.). 
 121. Codice deontologico forense [Bar Code of Conduct] art. 45 (It.) 
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nated.122 However, another section of the civil code still prohibits the 
assignment of rights and claims contested in litigation to lawyers in-
volved in it.123 While the law thus allows fees that are (partly) condi-
tional on success, it is not permissible to assign a percentage of the claim 
to the lawyer. 
By itself, however, the contingency fee prohibition does not seem to 
explain the absence of derivative litigation either. Hertig and McCahery 
suggest that contingency fees already are “a common but concealed prac-
tice throughout Europe.”124 The new Italian law seems to allow at least 
conditional fees, and derivative suits still have not emerged as a promi-
nent factor.125 This is illustrated by the emergence of derivative suits in 
Japan in the early 1990s. Two-part tariffs consisting of a fixed retainer 
and a fee conditional on success—either in the form of a judgment or a 
settlement—were seemingly enough to encourage derivative litigation.126 
For Japanese firms representing shareholders, retainers tend to be low 
and success fees high.127 
Hence, it appears that the legality of a conditional fee arrangement 
should suffice to encourage some litigation. The foregoing discussion 
establishes that some kind of reward is needed for possible plaintiffs to 
overcome the collective action/free rider problem that is inherent to the 
corporate structure. Favorable lawyers’ fee arrangements, however, are 
not necessarily the only mechanism that creates incentives either on law-
yers or on shareholders to engage in corporate litigation. As I discuss in 
Part 3, there are other mechanisms of shareholder litigation that have 
widespread use without derivative litigation, particularly nullification 
suits in Germany, where the plaintiff’s risk is also low compared to the 
personal benefit. Furthermore, even with high-powered contingency fees 
in place, there must be a reasonable chance of winning or settling favora-
bly to make the suit worthwhile ex ante for the lawyer. If courts are 
strongly biased against plaintiffs or plaintiffs have little access to infor-
                                                                                                  
 122. C.C. art. 2233(3) (It.) (now only requiring a written agreement between lawyers 
and clients and no longer prescribing fees based on outcome of litigation). 
 123. C.C. art. 1261 (It.). 
 124. Hertig & McCahery, supra note 114, at 193. 
 125. See Enriques, The Comparative Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 94, at 
1024 (suggesting that the “loser pays” rule has been more important in preventing the 
emergence of an entrepreneurial plaintiff bar in Europe). 
 126. See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 15, at 365. 
 127. See id. at 368–72 (noting that, “in practice, many derivative-suit attorneys reduce 
their retainers”). 
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mation forming the basis for evidence of wrongdoing, suing will still be 
difficult. 
2.2.4. Requirement to Advance Court Fees 
The last element of litigation cost that could deter derivative suits is the 
high up-front fees that a plaintiff has to pay to the court in order to com-
mence the suit. If the amount is high enough, fees of this type will make 
it difficult to finance a suit. Even a shareholder with a considerable stake 
might be tempted to reconsider if he is not sure about the action’s chance 
of success. Mark West argued that Japanese derivative litigation was 
triggered by a 1993 court decision that did away with the previous prac-
tice of computing the filing fee as a percentage of the damages sought 
and replaced it with a relatively modest flat one of only ¥8200.128 He fur-
ther suggested that the Japanese courts’ practice of frequently requiring 
plaintiffs to post security for suits allegedly brought in bad faith and led 
to further deterrence.129 
A superficial look at the complexities of litigation cost in Europe indi-
cates that the above explanation is plausible in some cases, but does not 
provide a universal explanation for the scarcity of derivative suits. For 
example, German courts generally only serve a suit if the fee for the trial 
is paid.130 The amount of the fee indeed depends on the amount in dis-
pute, and can generally reach an amount of tens of thousands of Euros if 
the amount in dispute is several million. For the “lawsuit admission pro-
cedure” introduced in 2005, the amount in dispute is usually capped at 
€500,000, which corresponds to an amount of a few thousand Euros.131 
                                                                                                  
 128. West, Pricing Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan & U.S., supra note 2, at 
1463–65; West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 15, at 353. But see Dan W. Puchniak 
& Masafumi Nakahigashi, Japan’s Love for Derivative Actions: Irrational Behavior and 
Non-Economic Motives as Rational Explanations for Shareholder Litigation, 45 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 48–50, 54–56 (2012) (criticizing this explanation because derivative 
suits apparently began before the change in the fee rules, and suggesting that suits were 
brought initiated by activist attorneys with non-monetary motivations). 
 129. West, Pricing Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan & U.S., supra note 2, at 
1465–66. 
 130. GKG § 12(1) (Ger.). 
 131. The base fee for an amount in dispute of €500,000 is €2,956, with an additional 
€150 in fees for every additional €50,000. GKG § 34(1) (Ger.) and GKG Anlage 2 (pro-
viding a table for the amount of one “value unit” of fees depending on the amount in 
dispute). In the case of a “normal” lawsuit, this amount is multiplied by 3. GKG Anlage 1, 
no. 1210 (providing that court fees generally amount to three “value units”), GKG Anlage 
1, no. 1640 (establishing a multiplier of 1.0 for an admission procedure under AktG 
§ 148). 
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In spite of the limit, the amount may be high enough to deter “casual” 
suits by portfolio shareholders.132 Furthermore, once the suit has been 
admitted by the court, fees on the basis of the actual amount in dispute 
apply, which may result in a substantially larger upfront payment (unless 
the corporation decides to take over the suit).133 By contrast, in France, 
derivative suits are not even hindered by a minimum ownership level, 
and courts only charge a nominal fee comparable to those in Japan.134 
However, it has been suggested that plaintiffs may be required to ad-
vance case-specific cost, e.g., for collecting evidence or for expert wit-
nesses, which may also create a deterrent effect.135 Nevertheless, as an 
explanation for the French case, legal fees are much less persuasive. 
Overall, it is probably safe to say that court fees are a possible deterrent 
factor, but they are not the only restrictive feature in Germany.136 
2.3. Access to Information 
As discussed in the preceding section, whether the law creates a struc-
ture that overcomes the free rider problem inherent in representative liti-
gation depends on how cost rules allocate litigation risk between plain-
tiffs, firms, and defendants. This other compounding factor is what risk 
there is, i.e., whether a suit is likely to be successful or not. If meeting 
the burden of proof is extremely difficult for shareholder plaintiffs, the 
best incentives set by litigation cost rules may not be enough to encour-
age suits. 
                                                                                                  
 132. Peltzer, supra note 104, at 955 n.7 (reporting that admission procedures are very 
rare based on a telephone survey among judges), and id. at 957 (arguing that fees will 
deter shareholders that do not hold a substantial stake). 
 133. See AktG § 148(3) (Ger.); Peltzer, supra note 104, at 959–60 (arguing that this 
possibility further discourages potential plaintiffs). By contrast, in France the courts have 
found that this is not possible. Cass com. 12-12-2000, 2001 REVUE DES SOCIÉTÉS 323 
(Fr.); Germain, supra note 24, at 409. 
 134. See, e.g., Tarifs des activités judiciaires [Rates of Judicial Activities], GREFFE DU 
TRIBUNAL DE COMMERCE DE PARIS [REGISTRY OF THE COURT OF COMMERCE OF PARIS] 
(July 1, 2011), http://www.greffe-tc-paris.fr/judiciaire/tarifs.htm (Fr.) (listing fees for 
various types of suit in the Paris commercial court). For comparison, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court currently charges a fee of $600 for a derivative suit. See Court of Chancery 
Court Fees or Charges, DEL. STATE COURTS, 
http://courts.delaware.gov/help/fees/chanceryfees.stm (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
 135. Schmidt, supra note 16, at 391. 
 136. Under some U.S. state laws, plaintiffs can be required to post security for the 
defendant’s expenses. E.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 627 (McKinney 2003) (establishing 
such a requirement for plaintiffs holding less than 5% and shares less than $50,000); see 
also CLARK, supra note 7, at 652–55 (discussing how these statutes were introduced to 
curb abusive litigation). 
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In some cases, the burden of proof creates particular problems. For ex-
ample, in Germany, Peltzer has argued that the requirement for plaintiffs 
to show dishonesty or serious violations of the law in order to pass the 
judicial admission procedure and the firm’s defense that a suit would not 
be in the interest of the company create considerable difficulty for plain-
tiffs.137 Standards such as the German one or the French requirement to 
show a “management mistake” are vague and thus create uncertainty 
while, at least in the German case, leaving a lot of room for the directors 
to claim spurious reasons why the suit would be harmful.138 Generally, 
the main problem seems to be plaintiff’s difficulty in obtaining the evi-
dence needed to make a plausible claim, which will typically require the 
plaintiff to have access to the company’s internal documents. Other than 
in the United States,139 shareholders normally do not have access to the 
company’s books and records and are limited to the right to ask questions 
in the shareholder meeting.140 
More importantly, in the United States, plaintiffs with a thin basis of 
evidence can avail themselves of pretrial discovery, in the course of 
which the defendant is required to disclose pertinent information to the 
plaintiff.141 Once the suit passes the demand requirement on the basis of 
relatively limited notice pleading, plaintiffs may rely on information 
gathered in discovery to coerce the defendant to settle or go to trial.142 In 
Europe, a party to a civil suit must generally identify specific documents 
and ask the court to order the other party to produce them; furthermore, it 
must explain why these documents are necessary and where they are lo-
                                                                                                  
 137. Peltzer, supra note 104, at 962–63. 
 138. Lutter, supra note 16, at 765; see also Peltzer, supra note 104, at 957–58; GUYON, 
supra note 16, at 493 (describing the French “management mistake” standard as vague 
and unclear). 
 139. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220 (2011); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
[RMBCA] §§ 16.02, 16.03 (1984) (entitling shareholders to inspect and copy corpora-
tion’s books and records for a proper purpose). 
 140. Cox & Thomas, supra note 34, at 355–56; Paul, supra note 104, at 102–03; Gi-
udici, supra note 16, at 254. 
 141. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Guido A. Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals 
and the Role of Private Enforcement 50–51 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 
40, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=730403 (explaining that U.S. discovery 
rules are so far-reaching that they typically shock Continental European lawyers); Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636 (1989) (generally discuss-
ing the potential abuse in discovery). 
 142. See generally Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 37, at 
701–02 (discussing an explanation for the cost differential between plaintiffs and defen-
dants). 
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cated.143 The absence of a wide-ranging discovery procedure is often 
thought to make derivative suits, particularly strike suits, more difficult 
in Europe.144 Fishing expeditions are typically not permitted, while “the 
opponent’s obligations to cooperate are usually strict and quite restric-
tive.”145 A motion to produce a general class of documents will normally 
not be granted.146 Mark West reports that in Japan, where U.S.-style dis-
covery also does not exist, shareholders are sometimes able to avoid the 
information problem by piggybacking on the information brought to light 
in public enforcement actions.147 
Is there a Continental European functional equivalent that makes up for 
this “information gap”? While there is no obvious or complete one, a 
mechanism that is sometimes brought up by Continental European ob-
servers is the appointment of a “special auditor” by a court upon applica-
tion by minority shareholders.148 The auditor, who will typically be an 
accounting professional or other certified expert, is tasked with review-
ing problematic or suspicious management activities and subsequently 
submits a report at the shareholder meeting. The information compiled 
by the auditor can—at least in theory—form the basis for a lawsuit. 
                                                                                                  
 143. Nathan M. Crystal & Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, Understanding Akzo Nobel: A 
Comparison of the Status of In-House Counsel, the Scope of the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, and Discovery in the U.S. and Europe, 11 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 23–24 (2011); see also 
Ferrarini & Giudici, supra note 141, at 51–52 (discussing the difference between notice 
pleading in the United States and fact pleading in Italy, and its implications for share-
holder litigation). 
 144. Enriques, The Comparative Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 94, at 1024; 
Schmidt, supra note 16, at 391 (pointing out that directors control what information the 
corporation discloses in a French derivative suit); Ferrarini & Giudici, supra note 141, at 
51, 53; John W. Cioffi, Adverserialism versus Legalism: Juridification and Litigation in 
Corporate Governance Reform, 3 REG. & GOV. 235, 245 (2009). 
 145. Rolf Stürner, Transnational Civil Procedure: Discovery and Sanctions against 
Non-Compliance, 6 UNIFORM L. REV. 871, 876 (2001). 
 146. “Only in more exceptional cases, when a party has no exact knowledge of facts 
and means of evidence in the sphere of its opponent and shows a good cause for an al-
leged fact . . . the court may order the production and inspection of a category of docu-
ments or tangible things.” Id. 
 147. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 15, at 380–81. On a similar process in 
France, see infra Section 3.2. 
 148. See Paul, supra note 104, at 103–04 (emphasizing the connection between the 
purpose of the special audit and the derivative suit). 
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The corporate laws of all countries discussed here, except Spain, pro-
vide for a minority right of this type.149 The exact procedure and the nec-
essary factual basis vary, but generally there has to be some indication of 
wrongdoing, and petitioners have to meet a certain minimum ownership 
threshold. In both France and Germany, the threshold was reduced in 
recent years, namely from 10% or €1,000,000 to 1% or €100,000 to peti-
tion for the appointment of a Sonderprüfer in the German 2005 reform,150 
and from 10% to 5% in France in 2001 to initiate an expertise de ges-
tion.151 Belgium also has a 1% (or €1,250,000) threshold,152 while in Italy 
(10% and 5% in publicly traded firms),153 Austria (10%),154 and Switzer-
land (10%/CHF 2,000,000) thresholds are relatively high.155 
 
(See table on next page.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                  
 149. See Kalss, supra note 30, at 342 (“All legal systems except Spain and England 
provide for a special audit.”) (internal citation omitted). The more far-reaching Dutch 
inquiry proceedings are discussed in Section 3.3 infra. 
 150. The so-called AktG § 148 I, as amended by UMAG (Ger.); AktG § 142 II (Ger.); 
see also Conac et al., supra note 50, at 512 (discussing the threshold reduction). The 
usual 10% for forcing the corporation into litigation is reduced to 5% if a special audit 
that brought results to light that indicate liability claims. AKTG § 134(1) (Austria). 
  Interestingly, there is no such threshold in a German de facto group, which allows 
individual shareholder to ask for an appointment. However, the circumstances when this 
is possible are fairly limited: either the firm’s statutory auditor must have found account-
ing irregularities, the supervisory board found irregularities with the management’s report 
on group relations, or management board must have declared that disadvantageous trans-
actions were not compensated. See AktG § 315 (Ger.). 
 151. See C. COM. art. L. 225-231 (Fr.). 
 152. CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 168 (Belg.). 
 153. C.C. art. 2409(1) (It.). 
 154. See AKTG § 130(2) (Austria). 
 155. OR art. 697(b), para. 1 (Switz.). 
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Country Minimum  
ownership 
Note 
Austria 10%  
Belgium 1% or 
€1,250,000 
 
France 5%  
Germany 1% or €100,000  
Italy 10% 
5% 
not publicly traded 
Publicly traded 
The Netherlands 10% more far-reaching  
“inquiry proceed-
ings” (see section 
3.3) 
Spain N/A  
Switzerland 10% or CHF  
2,000,000 
 
Table 2: Minimum ownership thresholds for the appointment of a spe-
cial auditor 
As a true functional equivalent to discovery, special audits seem to fail 
by and large. The instrument is relatively popular in France, partly be-
cause the minority right can be exercised by a shareholder association.156 
Furthermore, under the general law of civil procedure, individual share-
holders can also ask the court to appoint an expert even before a trial to 
establish facts.157 Elsewhere, special auditors are not appointed fre-
quently, although appointments happen occasionally.158 Both in Germany 
and Italy, requirements to show “serious” irregularities put a heavy bur-
                                                                                                  
 156. Holger Fleischer, Aktienrechtliche Sonderprüfung und Corporate Governance, 46 
RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 809, 810–11 (2000) (Ger.) (comparing 
the frequency of court-appointed audits in France and Germany). Regarding the extensive 
case law regarding when an appointment is permissible, see MERLE & FAUCHON, supra 
note 22, ¶ 523. In Switzerland, the effectiveness of the instrument is hindered by a statute 
of limitations, which prohibits derivative suits six months after a shareholder meeting in 
which the majority approved the “discharge” of the board of directors. OR art. 758, para. 
2 (Switz.). This applies even to shareholders who voted against the resolution. This may 
not leave enough time for an audit to be performed thoroughly. Glanzmann, supra note 
16, at 175. 
 157. C.P.C. art. 145 (Fr.); see Conac et al., supra note 50, at 512 (pointing out that in 
this case the cost is not borne by the corporation). 
 158. For Germany, see, for example, Michael Nietsch, Klageinitiative und besondere 
Vertretung in der Aktiengesellschaft, 40 ZGR 589, 592–95 (2011) (Ger.) (discussing the 
HVB and IKB cases in both of which a special auditor was appointed by a court). 
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den of proof on the petitioner, which rules out fishing expeditions.159 In 
Italy, the court’s ability to order the petitioning minority shareholders to 
provide a deposit to cover cost for the ispezione giudiziale may act as a 
further deterrent.160 Moreover, since the 2003 reform in Italy, the court 
can suspend the inspection if the majority replaces the directors and the 
members of the board of auditors, or collegio sindacale, with members 
who profess to take action to ascertain the alleged violations and elimi-
nate them.161 Since minority shareholders have no way of forcing the 
continuation of the outside audit, the majority is in a relatively good po-
sition to abort an inspection by replacing the current directors with 
“friendly” ones who will not allow a suit to proceed.162 
In general, the minimum threshold seems to be a major hurdle since 
the percentage required is generally higher than the percentage require-
ment for a derivative suit.163 Even France and Switzerland, which allow 
derivative suits without providing for a minimum threshold, require one 
for the initiation of a special audit. The higher thresholds for the ap-
pointment of the auditor clearly inhibit the effectiveness of this tool for 
gathering information for a derivative suit.164 
2.4. Limitations Regarding Potential Defendants 
Besides the factors already discussed, it is important to point out that, 
compared to the United States, derivative actions in Europe are limited in 
scope, which further reduces their attractiveness for potential plaintiffs 
who will resort to other instruments. This aspect seems not to have been 
discussed in the literature yet. In the United States, anyone can be sued 
derivatively. While the defendant is “usually an officer, director or other 
                                                                                                  
 159. Schröer, supra note 55, § 142, ¶ 10; OBERLANDESGERICHT STUTTGART [OLG 
Stuttgart] [Stuttgart Higher Regional Court] June 15, 2010, 15 UF 85/10 (Ger.). For Italy, 
see C.C. art. 2409(1) (It.). 
 160. C.C. art. 2409(2) (It.). 
 161. Id. art. 2409(3). 
 162. I thank the participants of the Rome Fordham Alumni Meeting for pointing out 
this issue to me. 
 163. See Glanzmann, supra note 16, at 175–76 (also pointing out that petitioners bear a 
significant risk of having to pay for the audit); Grechenig & Sekyra, supra note 16, at 20 
(suspecting that the scarcity of derivative suits in Switzerland may be based on “a percen-
tage limit for initiating an investigation essential for bringing a lawsuit[]”). 
 164. See Glanzmann, supra note 16, at 175 (suggesting that the shareholders’ individ-
ual right to launch a derivative suit may be toothless given that they are unlikely to have 
enough information to form the basis of a suit); Kalss, supra note 30, at 342 (arguing that 
the minimum thresholds for both types of minority rights should be the same). 
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fiduciary of the corporation,” this is by no means a legal prerequisite.165 
The applicable section of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—
equivalent statutes exist in state law—simply refers to “a right that the 
corporation or association may properly assert but has failed to en-
force,”166 but says nothing about the defendant or the nature of the suit.167 
Legally, a derivative suit can be any type of suit. 
In all of the countries surveyed here, the legal basis for derivative suits 
is, in all cases, found in a section of the respective corporate law govern-
ing directors’ liability. This fact has two important consequences. First, 
derivative suits are only available for claims to damages. The French 
courts, for example, found that derivative actions are not available for 
injunctions.168 The potential of derivative litigation to prevent harmful 
corporate behavior ex ante and to put pressure on those actually in con-
trol of the corporation is therefore low. Of course, this does not imply 
that shareholders cannot, given the appropriate circumstances, seek judi-
cial recourse to block corporate actions. German courts, for example, 
recognize, without any specific statutory basis, an individual share-
holder’s right to enjoin actions taken by the board that infringe in the 
decision-making power of the shareholder meeting.169 When the board 
dutifully sought shareholders’ approval, a single shareholder can sue to 
rescind the decision taken in the shareholder meeting if it is in violation 
                                                                                                  
 165. CLARK, supra note 7, at 639. 
 166. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a). 
 167. Corporate statutes also accept that derivative suits are available against anyone. 
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145 (2011), which governs the corporation’s power to in-
demnify for litigation expenses, lawsuits, and settlements. Specifically subsection (b) 
speaks of suits “in the right of the corporation” and permits that “any person who was or 
is a party or is threatened to be made a party” can be indemnified under certain circum-
stances if that person acted as that corporation’s fiduciary. Id. Thus, the statute implicitly 
recognizes the derivative suit against anyone. And in fact, experience shows that defen-
dants in many much-publicized important suits (that appear in casebooks) are in fact 
controlling shareholders (who are alleged to be in violation of their duty of loyalty). 
 168. See Benjamin Mojuyé, French Corporate Governance in the New Millennium: 
Who watches the board in corporate France, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 73, 102, 102 n.94 
(2000). 
 169. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], June 25, 1982, 83 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 122, 1982 (Ger.); 
see Von Johannes Adolff, Zur Reichweite des verbandsrechtlichen Abwehranspruch des 
Aktionärs gegen rechtswidriges Verwaltungshandeln, 169 ZHR 310 (2005) (Ger.). Cf. 
Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274 (Del. Ch. 1981) (granting a shareholder an injunction 
against the sale of substantially all assets in a direct suit). 
2012] SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS IN EUROPE? 877 
of the law.170 Rescission suits, which will be discussed in Part 3.1, are 
quite popular across the Continent partly because they allow shareholders 
to block significant corporate action. In comparison, derivative litigation 
is not terribly relevant. 
Second, possible defendants in Continental European derivative suits 
are limited to directors (including supervisory board members),171 and in 
some cases corporate officers,172 auditors,173 or the founders of the corpo-
ration.174 The opportunity to engage with controlling shareholders is 
therefore limited.175 True, sometimes controlling shareholders may be 
sued because they are also directors, and in rare cases a director can be 
successfully sued for failing to prevent illicit self-dealing by controlling 
shareholders; the limitation may still, however, prevent litigation that 
would otherwise be brought. 
A possible exception can arise when a controlling shareholder is quali-
fied as a de facto director (i.e., a person managing the company and act-
ing like a director without formally having been appointed). This seems 
to happen occasionally in Italy and France. Consequently, the rules on 
derivative suits apply.176 There are, however, considerable limitations. In 
                                                                                                  
 170. This includes violations of the controlling shareholders’ duty of loyalty and the 
actionable abuse of majority power where applicable. 
 171. CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 562 (Belg.); Ley de Sociedades Anónimas art. 134(1) 
(B.O.E. 1989, 1564) (Spain) (speaking of “liability suits against directors”). In France 
and Italy, the limitation is implicit since the legal basis for derivative suits (or their 
equivalents) is in the respective statutory section governing director’s liability. C.C. arts. 
L. 225-249 through 225-257 (Fr.) govern the civil liability of directors and promoters of 
the corporation. For Italy, see C.C. arts. 2393, 2393bis (It.); ALESSANDRO DE NICOLA, 
SHAREHOLDER SUITS 177 (2006) (pointing out that only directors, managers, and auditors 
can be sued derivatively in Italy). 
 172. Swiss law includes “persons involved in management.” OR art. 754, para. 1 
(Switz.). 
 173. Id. arts. 754–56; C.C. arts. 2393, 2393bis (It.); Ley de Sociedades Anónimas art. 
211 (Spain) (referring to the provisions regarding suits against directors). 
 174. See AktG § 147(1) (Ger.) and AKTG § 134(1) (Austria) (both listing only mem-
bers of the supervisory and management boards and promoters of the company as poten-
tial defendants). 
 175. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); In re S. Peru Copper 
Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011); Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis 
Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 
A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010) (derivative suits where the defendant is a shareholder). Derivative 
suits against shareholders also tend to be easier in private companies. See, e.g., C.C. art. 
2476(7) (It.) (providing that shareholders who intentionally approved acts harmful to the 
corporation are personally liable in an Italian s.r.l.). 
 176. For Italy, see, for example, FRANCESCO GALGANO & RICCARDO GENGHINI, 1 IL 
NUOVO DIRITTO SOCIETARIO [THE NEW COMPANY LAW] 483 (2006) (It.); for France, see 
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Italy, such shareholders can only be sued for actions taken in their capac-
ity as directors, but not for votes cast in the shareholder meeting, etc.177 
In France, courts have permitted suits of this type where the shareholder 
acted with the intention to harm.178 Moreover, it may be difficult to qual-
ify a corporate shareholder as a de facto director. In France, where corpo-
rations can be appointed as directors,179 banks have sometimes been 
qualified as de facto directors even in their role as creditors.180 However, 
such a doctrinal move is likely more difficult in the majority of other ju-
risdictions, where only natural persons can become directors. In any 
event, proving that a large shareholder qualifies as a de facto director 
may be hard for an outside investor. Any lawsuit would, therefore, re-
quire the plaintiff to overcome another evidentiary hurdle that creates an 
obstacle for shareholder litigation. 
The German law on corporate groups181 provides a special basis for 
suits against certain controlling shareholders. Substantively, this law 
provides that a “controlling undertaking” in a de facto group may not 
instruct a controlled firm to enter into disadvantageous transactions un-
less the latter is compensated for any disadvantages in the same financial 
year.182 In contrast to general corporate law, a minority shareholder can 
                                                                                                  
COZIAN ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 262; for Switzerland, see Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal 
Supreme Court] Dec. 12, 1991, 117 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN 
BUNDESGERICTS [BGE] II 570, 571 (Switz.) (finding that the defendants were not de facto 
directors in this specific case, but implying the possibility of a derivative suit if they 
were). 
 177. Conac et al., supra note 50, at 510. 
 178. Id. 
 179. In this case, it has to delegate a specific individual to perform the function on its 
behalf. 
 180. MERLE & FAUCHON, supra note 22, ¶ 412; COZIAN ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 262; 
for Switzerland, see Glanzmann, supra note 16, at 162–63. 
 181. The 1965 German Aktiengesetz pioneered the idea that corporate groups required 
special statutory recognition and special mechanisms protecting shareholders and credi-
tors of subsidiaries. AktG §§ 291–328 (Ger.). For a general description, see, for example, 
Peter Hommelhoff, Protection of Minority Shareholders, Investors and Creditors in Cor-
porate Groups: The Strengths and Weaknesses of German Corporate Group Law, 2 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 61 (2001) (providing an overview of the AktG and its impact on Ger-
man corporate groups). 
 182. AktG § 311 (Ger.). The management board of the controlled company is required 
to prepare a report on relations with other group firms within the first three months of the 
year, in which all intra-group transactions of the firm are described and compensation 
received is discussed. This “dependency report” (Abhängigkeitsbericht) must be audited 
by the statutory auditor and the supervisory board, which reports to the shareholder meet-
ing. See id. §§ 313, 314. Note that shareholders do not have access to the dependency 
report. 
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sue the controlling entity as well as directors of both the controlling firm 
and the controlled subsidiary on behalf of the corporation.183 The law 
neither provides for a percentage limit nor a demand requirement or judi-
cial pre-screening procedure.184 
There are a number of problems with this model. First, this only ap-
plies when the controlling shareholder qualifies as an “undertaking” (Un-
ternehmen) that practically controls the dependent firm and where busi-
ness connections go beyond mere share ownership, thus establishing a de 
facto group that includes both the controlling shareholder and the firm.185 
It is not entirely clear why minority shareholders require stronger protec-
tion in this case, as opposed to the situation where a firm is controlled by 
a private individual or a family.186 Second, the law has been criticized for 
actually making it easier for the controlling shareholder to harm the sub-
sidiary, since it explicitly allows disadvantages to the controlled firm as 
long as there is compensation.187 Third, it may be difficult to determine 
what exact advantages and disadvantages resulted from coordinated 
group policies.188 
In spite of the procedural advantages, shareholder litigation under the 
law of corporate groups has remained exceptionally rare. Ulmer, writing 
in 1999, summarized the state of affairs by saying that the suit had re-
mained “completely without any function in 30 years of its existence.”189 
Again, a major reason seems to be the financial risk created by litigation 
cost.190 In the absence of a special statute for this type of suit, a plaintiff 
                                                                                                  
 183. Id. §§ 317 III, 318. 
 184. Id. §§ 309 III, IV & 310 IV, 317 IV & 318 IV (all referring to § 309 III to V). The 
historical reason for the absence of a percentage limit was the impression that it is likely 
difficult for the required threshold to be met if there is a controlling undertaking. BRUNO 
KROPFF, AKTIENGESETZ 405 (1965) (Ger.). Holger Altmeppen, in 5 MÜNCHENER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 309, ¶ 121 (Wulf Goette & Mathias Habersack eds., 
3d ed. 2010) (Ger.). 
 185. HÜFFER, supra note 22, § 15, ¶ 8. 
 186. See, e.g., Ulrich Wackerbarth, Die Abschaffung des Konzernrechts, 9 DER 
KONZERN 562–63 (2005) (arguing that the conflict of interests is the same). 
 187. Id. at 564–65. 
 188. Susanne Kalss, Alternativen zum deutschen Aktienkonzernrecht, 171 ZHR 146, 
188–89 (2007). 
 189. Ulmer, supra note 19, at 300; see also Hirt, The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties, 
supra note 29, at 191–92 (discussing the experience with shareholder action and its sig-
nificance in application since its introduction). 
 190. Altmeppen, supra note 184, § 317, ¶ 57. The legislative report on the act also 
points out that the concern about abusive suits was thought not to be considerable when 
the law of corporate group was introduced, given that the plaintiff shareholder bears the 
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shareholder would need to potentially bear court fees computed on the 
basis of an amount in dispute, which, since the latter amount is usually a 
damages claim by the corporation, will typically add up to many mil-
lions.191 Even the fee that the plaintiff must pay before the court will 
serve the suit could, therefore, easily amount to tens of thousands of Eu-
ros.192 
Italy introduced a German-inspired law on corporate groups in 2003.193 
Corporations and other legal entities194 incur liability by harming sub-
sidiaries whose activities they “direct and coordinate” while acting in 
their own entrepreneurial interest. Shareholders have a direct but not a 
derivative claim under Italian law.195 Again, the burden of proof seems to 
be a major issue. Ventoruzzo argues that the various elements of the 
claim are hard to prove, such as the requirement to act in an entrepreneu-
rial interest and to violate the “principles of good management.”196 Fur-
thermore, the rule does not specifically look at the harm done to the firm, 
but only to the harm to shareholders created by a lower share value (or 
lost profitability) and losses incurred by creditors if the firm became in-
solvent.197 
                                                                                                  
risk of having to reimburse the firm for its cost. KROPFF, supra note 184, at 405; Altmep-
pen, supra note 184, § 309, ¶ 121. 
 191. It is sometimes suggested that AktG § 247(2) (Ger.), which allows the court to 
reduce the amount in dispute to protect indignant plaintiffs in a nullification suit, should 
apply by analogy. Altmeppen, supra note 184, § 309, ¶¶ 126–28. 
 192. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. Commentators have therefore often 
argued that the procedures forcing the corporation to bring the suit described above (ei-
ther under the pre- or the post-2005 law) could be used to enforce claims under the law of 
corporate groups to lighten the burden resulting from cost risk. E.g., Karsten Schmidt, 
Verfolgungspflichten, Verfolgungsrechte und Aktionärsklagen: Ist die Quadratur des 
Zirkels näher gerückt? Gedanken zur Reform der §§ 147-149 AktG vor dem Hintergrund 
der Juristentagsdiskussion des Jahres 2000, 2005 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] [NEW JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW] 796, 802 (Ger.); Alt-
meppen, supra note 184, § 317, ¶¶ 63–68 (both arguing that §§ 147 & 148 should apply). 
However, this theory has never been tested in the courts. 
 193. C.C. art. 2497 et seq. (It.). For an overview, see Paola Fasciani, Groups of Com-
panies: The Italian Approach, 4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 195 (2007). 
 194. It is not clear whether a natural person can also be sued under this provision. E.g., 
Fasciani, supra note 193, at 223 (discussing the controversy). Ventorozzo points out that 
many Italian firms are controlled by individuals, which renders the rule somewhat irrele-
vant. Ventoruzzo, supra note 68, at 251. 
 195. See Guido Ferrarini, Paolo Guidici & Mario Stella Richter, Company Law Reform 
in Italy? Real Progress, 69 RABELSZ 659, 694 (2005) (Ger.). 
 196. Ventoruzzo, supra note 68, at 252. 
 197. Ferrarini et al., supra note 195, at 695. 
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3. THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE: DO WE NEED DERIVATIVE 
LITIGATION? 
The previous section illustrates that there are at least four different ob-
stacles to shareholder derivative litigation in Continental Europe. Ad-
dressing a single one of them would likely not suffice to encourage this 
type of litigation. Hence, based on the sparse use of derivative suits in 
Continental Europe, one may conclude that corporate law is inadequately 
enforced in Continental Europe. From the American perspective, the 
scarcity is startling, since in the United States the derivative suit is a ma-
jor enforcement mechanism for corporate law. In this Section, I suggest 
that this situation is not quite as bad as one might believe. Other mecha-
nisms at least partly make up for this shortfall in enforcement and possi-
bly create at least some deterrence against wrongdoing by managers and 
controlling shareholders. However, it would be premature to conclude 
that there are effective functional equivalents in all cases. Without at-
tempting to provide a complete picture, the following subsections ex-
plore three enforcement mechanisms. Part 3.1 discusses the nullification 
suit, which is common across the European continent and has been dis-
cussed with particular intensity in Germany, given that it is often claimed 
that many of these suits are abusive. Part 3.2 looks at the role of criminal 
investigations using the example of France, where criminal investiga-
tions play a particularly important role. Part 3.3 discusses the Dutch “in-
quiry proceedings,” an instrument standing between public and private 
enforcement, where shareholders can induce a court to investigate mana-
gerial wrongdoing. 
3.1. Rescission Suits 
The private instruments of choice in much of Continental Europe are 
suits permitting shareholders to rescind or nullify decisions made in the 
shareholder meeting, and sometimes those of the board, because these 
decisions violate the law—including the majority shareholder’s duty of 
loyalty—or the company’s articles.198 
The rescission, or nullification, suit is of considerable significance in 
several Continental European countries given the frequency of share-
                                                                                                  
 198. For the legal basis of these lawsuits see AktG §§ 241–57 (Ger.); C. COM. art. L. 
235-1 (Fr.); C.c. arts. 2377–79 (It.); OR arts. 706, 708 (Switz.); Ley de Sociedades Anó-
nimas art. 115 (B.O.E. 1989, 1564) (Spain); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 178 (Belg.); 
BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 2:13–2:16 (Neth.); AKTG §§ 195–202 
(Austria). Laws often explicitly distinguish between resolutions that are void and those 
that can be avoided. 
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holder votes. Shareholders generally need to vote on more issues than 
their American counterparts. Like in the United States, European share-
holders vote on election and removal of directors,199 mergers,200 and 
changes to the articles.201 Changes to the articles include increasing the 
company’s capital, which is necessary to issue new shares,202 and reduc-
tions of capital.203 Furthermore, shareholders vote on the waiver of pre-
emptive rights204 and the election of the company’s auditor.205 In France, 
Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Spain, shareholders 
also vote on the approval of financial statements,206 and in Germany and 
Austria, shareholders do so in the case of a disagreement between the 
                                                                                                  
 199. AktG § 103 (Ger.); C. COM. art. L. 225-18 (Fr.); AKTG § 87 (Austria); Ley de 
Sociedades Anónimas arts. 123, 131 (Spain); C.C. art. 2364(2) (It.); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS 
art. 518(2), (3) (Belg.); BW arts. 2:132, 2:134 (Neth.). 
 200. Umwandlungsgesetz [UmwG] [Reorganization Act], Oct. 28, 1994, BGBL. I at 
3210, §§ 13, 65 (Ger.) (requiring a supermajority of three quarters); C. COM. art. L. 236-2 
(Fr.); AKTG § 221 (Austria); FUSIONSGESETZ [FUSG] [MERGER ACT] Oct. 3, 2003, arts. 
18(a), 43, 64(a) (Switz.) (requiring a two thirds supermajority); Ley 3/2009 de 3 de abril 
sobre modificaciones estructurales de las sociedades mercantiles arts. 8, 40 (B.O.E. 2009, 
3) (Spain); C.C. art. 2365 (It.); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 699 (Belg.); BW art. 2:317 
(Neth.). 
 201. See AktG § 179 (Ger.); C. COM. art. L. 225-96 (Fr.); AKTG § 145 (Austria); OR 
art. 647 (Switz.); Ley de Sociedades Anónimas art. 144 (Spain); C.C. art. 2365 (It.); CODE 
DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 558 (Belg.); BW art. 2:121 (Neth.). 
 202. See AktG §§ 182, 192, 202 (Ger.); C. COM. arts. L. 225-129, L. 225-130 (Fr.); 
AKTG §§ 149, 159, 169 (Austria); OR art. 650, 651, 653, para. 1 (Switz.); Ley de So-
ciedades Anónimas art. 152.1 (Spain); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 581 (Belg.); BW art. 2:96 
(Neth.); Council Directive 77/91, art. 25, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1, 8 (EC). 
 203. See AktG §§ 222, 229, 237 (Ger.); C. COM. art. L. 225-204 (Fr.); AKTG § 175 
(Austria); OR art. 732 (Switz.); Ley de Sociedades Anónimas art. 164.1 (Spain); CODE 
DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 612 (Belg.); BW art. 2:99 (Neth.). 
 204. See AktG § 186(3) (Ger.); C. COM. art. L. 225-135 (Fr.); AKTG § 153(3) (Austria); 
OR art. 652b (Switz.) (permitting the shareholder meeting to waive the preemptive right 
for an important reason); Ley de Sociedades Anónimas art. 159.1 (Spain); C.C. art. 2441 
(It.); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 596 (Belg.); BW art. 2:96a(6) (Neth.). 
 205. HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], Oct. 15, 1897, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL] 219, as amended Dec. 22, 2011, BGBL. I 3044, § 318 
(Ger.); C. COM. arts. L. 225-228, L 823-1 (Fr.); UNTERNEHMENSGESETZBUCH [UGB] 
[BUSINESS ENTERPRISE CODE], Oct. 15, 1897, RGBL. 219 (Ger.) (as HGB), introduced in 
Austria, Dec. 24, 1938, RGBL. I 1428, renamed UGB, Oct. 27, 2005, BGBL. I No. 
120/2005, as amended BGBL. I No. 35/2012 , § 270 (Austria); OR art. 730 (Switz.); Ley 
de Sociedades Anónimas art. 204 (Spain); BW art. 2:393(Neth.). The vote is a require-
ment of EU law. EU Audit Directive 2006/43/EC of May 17, 2006, O.J. l 157/87, art. 37. 
 206. C. COM. art. L. 225-100 (Fr.); OR art. 698(3) (Switz.); Ley de Sociedades 
Anónimas art. 212 (Spain); C.C. art. 2364(1) (It.); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 554 (Belg.); 
BW arts. 2:117(5), 2:362(6) (Neth.). 
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supervisory and the management board.207 It is also typically required 
that shareholders vote on the distribution of dividends.208 Finally, in 
European companies, shareholders often vote on annual “discharge” 
resolutions regarding directors, which do not extinguish liability in most 
jurisdictions, but imply general approval of the board.209 These votes are 
often, but not in all countries, explicitly required by the law.210 
Of course, suits to determine the validity of a shareholder resolution 
are possible in the United States as well.211 But given the larger number 
of significant shareholder votes and the prevalence of concentrated own-
ership structures in Continental Europe, these suits address some of the 
issues that would be litigated in shareholder derivative suits or class ac-
tions take in the United States, thus making the absence of such suits a 
much less significant concern. Under concentrated ownership, share-
holder resolutions are typically passed with the vote of majority share-
holders or a coalition of large shareholders, who are effectively able to 
put the board in place and to determine corporate policies. While the 
formal defendant in a suit of this type is the corporation,212 they are de 
facto directed against the corporation’s majority shareholders.213 For ex-
ample, in France, the doctrine of abus de majorité, which limits the 
power of majority shareholders to act in their own interest, developed 
largely as a result of rescission suits.214 In Germany and Italy, these law-
suits have become so widespread that legislative measures have been 
                                                                                                  
 207. See AktG § 173 (Ger.); AKTG § 104(3) (Austria); for France see, for example, 
MERLE & FAUCHON, supra note 22, ¶ 481 (discussing “quitus”). If an Italian company 
uses the German-inspired dualistic system, shareholders do not vote on the financial 
statements. 
 208. See AktG § 58 (Ger.); C. COM. art. L. 232-11 (Fr.); AKTG § 104(2)(2) (Austria); 
OR art. 698, para. 4 (Switz.); Ley de Sociedades Anónimas art. 213 (Spain); C.C. art. 
2364bis(1)(4) (It.). 
 209. Among the countries surveyed here, Belgium seems to be the only one where a 
discharge resolution extinguishes liability. See Bertrand & Coibion, supra note 44, at 
283–84, 287. 
 210. AktG § 120(1) (Ger.); AKTG § 104(2)(3) (Austria); OR art. 698, para. 5 (Switz.); 
CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 554 (Belg.); EUGENIA UNANYANTS-JACKSON, DIRECTORS’ 
LIABILITY DISCHARGE PROPOSALS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SHAREHOLDERS 28, 31 (Sarah 
Wilson ed., 2008) (pointing out that discharge resolutions are common also in the Nether-
lands and Spain, but do not extinguish directors’ liability). 
 211. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 225 (2011). 
 212. See van Aaken, supra note 31, at 302; Luca Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges 
Matter? Some Evidence from Milan, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 765, 784 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges Matter?]. 
 213. Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges Matter?, supra note 212, at 784. 
 214. Germain, supra note 24, at 412; GUYON, supra note 16, at 488. 
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taken to curb alleged abuse.215 Generally, nullification suits do not re-
quire the plaintiff shareholder to hold a certain percentage of shares.216 
Only in 2003 did Italy introduce a threshold of 5% for unlisted and 0.1% 
for listed companies.217 Rescission suits are sometimes limited by a short 
prescription period, e.g., one month after the meeting in Germany for 
most suits,218 ninety days in Italy,219 but three years in France.220 
In Germany, allegedly abusive litigation by so-called “predatory 
shareholders”221 continues to cause debate and resulted in the production 
of voluminous literature. In 2010 alone, 70 publicly-traded companies 
were sued.222 For the years 2006 through 2008, Vermeulen and Zetzsche 
report 135, 164, and 163 suits respectively, which is by all means not a 
negligible number given that 752 German companies were listed in regu-
                                                                                                  
 215. Abuse has also been an issue elsewhere. See Klaus J. Hopt, Shareholder Rights 
and Remedies: A View from Germany and the Continent, 1 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY 
L. REV. 261, 268 (1997) (reporting that abuse has become common in France and Bel-
gium as well, although the issue was dealt with by the courts and has received less atten-
tion from academic commentators); GUYON, supra note 16, at 490–91 (discussing the 
abuse of legal rights of minority shareholders in France); see also Bertrand & Coibion, 
supra note 44, at 498 (reporting a “significant amount” of suits in Belgium). 
 216. AktG § 245(1) (Ger.); AKTG § 196(1)(1) (Austria) (both providing that a share-
holder who submitted a written objection in the shareholder meeting has standing); OR 
art. 406 para. 1 (Switz.); CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS art. 178 (Belg.); BW art. 2:15(3)(a) (Neth.) 
(both providing that a person with a legal interest can sue); Ley de Sociedades Anónimas  
(B.O.E. 1989, 1564) art. 117 (Spain); see Germain, supra note 24, at 412; CHAVARÉT ET 
AL., supra note 79, ¶ 28353 (both explaining that in France, the party the law intends to 
protect can sue).  
 217. C.C. art. 2377(3) (It.). Since 1975, a 5% threshold has prevented—and still pre-
vents today—small shareholders of listed companies from challenging the validity of 
resolutions approving annual accounts of listed companies on the grounds that the com-
panies fail to conform with the provisions governing the preparation thereof, provided 
that the company’s auditor has judged the accounts to be consistent with such provisions 
and generally accepted accounting principles. See Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges 
Matter?, supra note 212, at 785–86. 
 218. AktG 246(1) (Ger.). 
 219. C.C. art. 2377(6) (It.). There are longer limitation periods for violations of the law 
that are so fundamental that they are not considered just voidable, but void. See AktG 
242(2) (Ger.) (three years). For Italy, see GALGANO & GENGHINI, supra note 176, at 393 
(three years). 
 220. C. COM. art. L. 235-9 (Fr.). 
 221. The German term is “räuberischer Aktionär.” See, e.g., Burkhard Hess & Chri-
stoph Leser, “Räuberische” Aktionäre—Ist das Prozessrecht hilflos?, in FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR UWE H. SCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 519. 
 222. Walter Bayer & Thomas Hoffmann, Beschlussmängelklagen: Rechtstatsachen 
aus 2010, 2011 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (AG-REPORT) R175, R175. 
2012] SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS IN EUROPE? 885 
lated markets and 450 were traded in open markets in 2008.223 Most of 
these suits are brought by a small circle of about 40 repeat plaintiffs.224 
Baums et al. report 580 suits in publicly traded firms between July 1, 
2007 and July 30, 2011.225 
Rescission suits are attractive because their disruptive potential creates 
an effective bargaining tool for the plaintiff against the firm and domi-
nant shareholders.226 While the suit is pending, plaintiffs can enjoin the 
transaction that has been voted on, thus often preventing the transaction 
from proceeding.227 Even a pending lawsuit relating to the firm’s annual 
decisions—such as the discharge resolution—the election of the auditor, 
or the payment of dividends, can be bothersome.228 It is thus often al-
leged that certain plaintiff shareholders bring lawsuits basically to “to 
blackmail companies into lucrative settlement agreements.”229 Most aca-
demic commentators seem to believe that the majority of rescission suits 
in Germany are abusive.230 Instead of suing derivatively, “predatory 
shareholders” are alleged to excessively use shareholder rights in the 
formal meeting to provoke formal mistakes that are grounds for rescis-
sion suits.231 Some firms are reported to have preemptively paid “profes-
sional plaintiffs” to not attend the annual general meeting.232 
                                                                                                  
 223. Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche, The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits, 7 
EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2010). 
 224. Theodor Baums, Astrid Keinath & Daniel Gajek, Fortschritte bei Klagen gegen 
Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse, 28 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] [JOURNAL 
OF BUSINESS LAW] 1629, 1635–37 (2007) (Ger.) [hereinafter Baums et al., Fortschritte bei 
Klagen] (listing the names of repeat plaintiffs). 
 225. Theodor Baums, Florian Drinhausen & Astrid Keinath, Anfechtungsklagen und 
Freigabeverfahren. Eine empirische Studie, 32 ZIP 2329, 2331 (2011) (Ger.) [hereinafter 
Baums et al., Anfechtungsklagen und Freigabeverfahren]. 
 226. Conac et al., supra note 50, at 513. 
 227. Id. at 513; see C.C. art. 2378(3) (It.) (plaintiffs may petition court to order direc-
tors not to execute the resolution). For Germany, see HÜFFER, supra note 22, § 243, ¶ 66. 
The trial court may issue an injunction halting the registration in the register of compa-
nies under ZPO §§ 935–45 (Ger.). 
 228. Baums et al., Anfechtungsklagen und Freigabeverfahren, supra note 225, at 2337 
(noting an increase in the number of suits attacking the election of the auditor). 
 229. Conac et al., supra note 50, at 513. 
 230. E.g., Hopt, supra note 215, at 267 (“Since the late 70s this has become a 
plague.”); Vermeulen & Zetzsche, supra note 223, at 60 (finding that most suits between 
2005 and 2008 qualified as abusive, using criteria such as the person of the plaintiff, the 
type of legal counsel, the nature of the complaint, and backing by institutional sharehold-
ers). 
 231. Hess & Leser, supra note 221, at 522. 
 232. Id. at 521–22. 
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A rescission lawsuit can be particularly disruptive when a corporation 
needs shareholder approval to issue new shares or to reduce the firm’s 
capital since these measures cannot be recorded in the company register 
while the suit is pending.233 Germany, therefore, introduced a “clearance 
procedure” (Freigabeverfahren) in 2005, thus allowing the court to let an 
increase or reduction of capital, or the integration of a corporation into a 
contractual group to go ahead in spite of a pending suit. The court may 
grant the corporation’s motion “if the suit is patently baseless, or if the 
alleged violations of the law are less onerous to the firm and its share-
holders than the disadvantage of the transaction grounding to a halt.”234 
The introduction of a percentage threshold in Italy was motivated by 
similar concerns. 
Given the scarcity of derivative suits in Germany, even after the 2005 
reform, the omnipresence of rescission suits provides a puzzle, but only 
at first glance. There are four distinct advantages. First, as already ex-
plained, a shareholder can relatively easily “harass” the corporation with 
suits of this type. Second, the absence of a minimum ownership thresh-
old may play a role in comparison to derivative suits (but not in compari-
son to suits under the law of corporate groups). Third, the substantive 
case for a claim is easier to make. A plaintiff does not need to show a 
“serious” violation of a law to pass a judicial prescreening procedure as 
he would to bring a derivative suits. Many suits rest on claims that the 
corporation failed to follow the appropriate procedure (e.g., by providing 
                                                                                                  
 233. E.g., Thorsten Helm & Nikolaus Vincent Manthey, Missbräuchliche Anfech-
tungsklagen im Aktienrecht—Rechtsvergleich und Lösungsansätze, 2010 NZG 415, 415 
(Ger.). 
 234. Conac et al., supra note 50, at 514; § 246a AktG, as amended by UMAG, Sept. 
22, 2005, BGBL. I at 2802 (Ger.); see also Till Naruisch & Fabian Liepe, Latest Devel-
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  Similarly, the Italian corporate law reform of 2003 specified that the judge has to 
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note 193, at 211–12. 
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inadequate disclosure to shareholders before the general meeting).235 
However, alleged violations of substantive standards such as the duty of 
loyalty also play a role.236 
Fourth, the cost risk is limited and foreseeable. In principle, the Eng-
lish Rule applies to these lawsuits as well, the defendant being the corpo-
ration.237 However, the amount in dispute—which determines the amount 
of court fees the plaintiff has to advance—is limited to the lower of 10% 
of the corporation’s nominal capital or €500,000.238 The limitation is 
therefore similar to the one in the preliminary procedure to admit a de-
rivative suit (see above Section 2.2), but unlike in the latter case, there is 
no second stage of litigation where the amount in dispute could reach 
many millions, and the cost therefore is limited to tens of thousands of 
Euros. Theodor Baums argues that the risk of having to bear cost will 
therefore deter “occasional,” but not “professional,” plaintiffs.239 For the 
latter group, the possibility to put pressure on the corporation creates an 
equivalent incentive for plaintiffs to take action, as the contingency fee 
does for derivative suits in the United States. 
3.2. Criminal Investigations 
Another important alternative is shareholders’ ability to “piggyback” 
on criminal investigations. In France, directors’ duties are often thought 
to be subject to stronger scrutiny under criminal law than equivalent du-
ties in other countries.240 This does not imply that the risk of criminal 
liability in general is the greatest in France. This honor may in fact go to 
the United States, where violations of disclosure duties under the securi-
ties law carry strong criminal sanctions.241 By contrast, the French crime 
of abus de biens sociaux (abuse of corporate assets) penalizes directors’ 
misuse of the company’s property and credit in bad faith, “when direc-
                                                                                                  
 235. See Baums et al., Fortschritte bei Klagen, supra note 224, at 1640–41 (providing 
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 236. Id. 
 237. Theodor Baums, Die Prozesskosten der aktienrechtlichen Anfechtungsklage, in 
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tors knew that it was contrary to its interest.”242 Hence, prosecutors and 
courts look at the substance of managerial decision-making. 
Criminal sanctions used to enforce directors’ duties are not unique to 
France. Italian infedeltà patrimoniale243 and German Untreue,244 both 
meaning “disloyalty,” serve a similar function at least in part.245 French 
law, however, has been most widely discussed, particularly with respect 
to how minority shareholders can initiate criminal prosecution by filing a 
criminal complaint (plainte avec constitution de partie civile). Share-
holders can attach themselves to the prosecution in order to receive com-
pensation for damages.246 As explained by Conac et al., “[i]n order for 
the complaint to be admissible, it is enough that the circumstances which 
gave rise to the complaint allow the examining magistrate to consider 
‘possible’ the existence of the damage to the company and the link with 
the alleged abuse of corporate assets.”247 If this criterion is met, the ex-
amining magistrate has the duty to investigate.248 The examining judge 
also has the right to access the company’s documents, which solves the 
information problem shareholders otherwise would have to overcome. 
There were between 416 and 480 convictions per year between 2000 and 
2006, of which an estimated 20% have led to actual jail time.249 While it 
is likely that these are mostly small firms, it is potentially relevant for 
large firms as well. Recent developments have also made it easier for 
Italian shareholders to similarly file a criminal complaint by way of the 
so-called “parte civile.”250 
In recent years, dissatisfaction with the extent of criminal liability risk 
has grown in France, which is why the government commissioned a re-
                                                                                                  
 242. C. COM. L. 242-6 (Fr.). The maximum penalty is five years in prison. For a doc-
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port on the “decriminalization” of business law published in 2008. The 
core corporate infraction of abus de biens sociaux, however, was to re-
main in place according to the report.251 At least for now, the decrimi-
nalization project has been shelved. Overall, criminal redress often seems 
to assume the function of enforcing the duties of directors and officers, 
both in terms of deterrence and permitting the recovery of damages. It 
appears to be superior for shareholders, given that it involves no court 
fees or litigation risk, and that it also helps to overcome the information 
problem solved by discovery in the United States. 
3.3. The Dutch Inquiry Proceedings 
Dutch law provides another interesting model that combines a pri-
vately instigated judicial investigation with enforcement and is widely 
thought to be successful. While there is no derivative suit under Dutch 
corporate law,252 minority shareholders can petition the enterprise cham-
ber (ondernemingskamer), a special division of the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals, to launch an official investigation. A petition for an investiga-
tion can be brought, among other situations, to conduct an investigation 
into the business policies and the conduct of affairs of a legal person, i.e., 
when there is a problem with the company’s management (enquête or 
inquiry proceedings).253 A similar procedure can be launched to chal-
lenge the accuracy of a corporation’s financial statements.254 
A petition to start inquiry proceedings can be brought either by the ad-
vocate general of the court for reasons of public policy,255 by a labor un-
ion,256 or by shareholders holding the lower of a nominal capital of 
€225,000 or a 10% share in the company.257 The petitioner has to submit 
a written request stating why he believes that the company was being 
mismanaged. At that point, control and initiative over the investigation 
pass to the court.258 If the enterprise chamber finds that the petition is 
                                                                                                  
 251. JEAN-MARIE COULON ET AL., LA DÉPÉNALISATION DE LA VIE DES AFFAIRES 31–37 
(2008) (Fr.). 
 252. SCHUIT ET AL., supra note 43, at 155. 
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sufficiently substantiated, it appoints investigators.259 On the basis of the 
investigators’ report, the enterprise chamber determines whether the case 
amounts to “misconduct” and requires further action.260 The enterprise 
chamber can take an array of measures, including the dismissal of board 
members, the rescission of board or shareholder resolutions, the ap-
pointment of temporary board members, and even the dissolution of the 
company.261 While damages cannot be awarded in these proceedings, the 
corporation may subsequently ask the court to have the director respon-
sible for “a wrong policy or an unsatisfactory state of affairs” to indem-
nify the corporation for the costs of the proceedings.262 Furthermore, suc-
cessful inquiry proceedings may tarnish a director’s reputation and will 
consequently facilitate liability suits.263 
Interestingly, the inquiry proceeding has become reasonably common 
in spite of the high 10% threshold: in publicly traded firms alone, there 
were twenty-three cases from 2000 to 2007,264 nineteen of which were 
brought by minority shareholders, such as institutional investors and the 
Dutch Investors’ Association.265 Commentators argue that the main 
driver was that injunctive relieve became available in 1994 and has since 
become the rule, and often the de facto final decision, in disputes be-
tween majority and minority shareholders.266 Since then, the enterprise 
chamber acquired a reputation for resolving conflicts in a speedy manner 
                                                                                                  
 259. Vermeulen & Zetzsche, supra note 223, at 16. 
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and coming to reasonable and pragmatic solutions.267 Cost is not a deter-
rent factor, since expenses are by default borne by the firm; however, the 
court may order the petitioner to indemnify the firm if the petition was 
not made on well-founded grounds.268 Moreover, the comparatively high 
threshold of 10% most likely also prevents abusive petitions, given that 
such a high ownership stake typically indicates a strong commitment to 
the firm. Nevertheless, the inquiry proceeding has become an important 
mechanism for corporate law enforcement in the Netherlands that is 
widely considered a success, thus making the absence of a derivative suit 
mechanism a less pressing problem. 
CONCLUSION 
In my contribution to the symposium, I have attempted to demonstrate 
two things. First, the absence of derivative suits in Continental Europe 
cannot be explained with a single factor, but only with a whole range of 
elements that make them unavailable or render derivative suits unattrac-
tive to small shareholders. A version of the “Anna Karenina principle” 
applies analogously; in other words, several prongs have to be met to 
make a particular type of suit attractive. This is the case in the United 
States, but not in Continental Europe. Second, the dearth of derivative 
suits does not necessarily mean that there is no corporate law enforce-
ment, but rather that shareholders are likely to choose the “path of least 
resistance” (section 3) and use other methods to address grievances. 
Specifically, I have identified four necessary factors, which are as fol-
lows: the presence of liberal standing requirements, as opposed to Euro-
pean minimum ownership thresholds; a litigation cost structure that sets 
incentives that overcome the collective action problem; availability of 
information to plaintiffs; and the ability to sue those who actually control 
the firm, which in Europe often includes large shareholders. 
The most complicated factor, the allocation of litigation cost and risk, 
has three aspects. A considerable upfront cost can deter many suits. Be-
tween the other two factors, the “English Rule” of litigation cost and the 
availability of contingency fees, there are strong reasons to believe that 
contingency fees are more important given that the distinctions between 
the American and the English Rule are smaller than one might think at 
first glance. By contrast, contingency fees illustrate the importance of 
setting strong incentives for a private actor (such as a lawyer or a repeat 
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plaintiff). Other examples include conditional fees in Japanese share-
holder litigation and rescission suits brought by shareholders in Ger-
many. In the latter example, the motivation is also not the shareholder’s 
proportionate benefit from the shareholder’s stake of the firm, but per-
sonal advantages that the plaintiff can obtain in a settlement. As in the 
United States, there is an extensive debate regarding abusive suits by re-
peat plaintiffs and their illegitimate motives. Viewing both systems posi-
tively, one can suspect that plaintiffs need to be incentivized with a re-
ward that exceeds their individual share in the social harm. In a system of 
private enforcement, plaintiffs are bounty hunters that need to be prom-
ised a reward. The problem is that bounty hunters sometimes set exces-
sive enforcement actions and cause collateral damage. 
This Article shows that there are other systems of enforcement of cor-
porate law in Continental Europe. Some of these, such as rescission suits, 
are primarily private, and some are public, such as criminal enforcement. 
The prevalence of private mechanisms demonstrates that we do not need 
a “cultural” theory of corporate law to explain why derivative suits have 
not spread as widely in Europe as they have in the United States. The 
case of the rescission suit, most of all in Germany, does not support the 
hypothesis that Europeans are inherently less litigious than Americans, 
but rather indicates that the right incentives set by the institutional 
framework are decisive. The eclectic presentation of partly functional 
equivalent mechanisms of course does not demonstrate that Continental 
European corporate law is equally well enforced. For example, rescission 
suits may capture issues that are important enough to warrant a share-
holder vote, but not violations of directors’ fiduciary duties that happen 
below the radar screen of the shareholder meeting. Furthermore, the ab-
sence of derivative suits seems to imply that Continental European pri-
vate enforcement mechanisms suffer from the inability of plaintiffs to 
obtain sufficient information. While private enforcement mechanisms 
often invite excessive use, public mechanisms may tend to under-enforce 
and weaken incentives to vigorously pursue wrongdoing by directors, 
managers, and controlling shareholders. No system is perfect, and a 
global assessment is beyond the scope of this contribution. 
